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Elizabeth Tricomi, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
 
Although the caudate nuclei are involved in processing performance feedback, the specific 
conditions under which feedback engages the caudate are not well understood.  It is unclear 
whether feedback in a declarative memory task can activate the caudate to the same extent as a 
non-declarative task.  Likewise, it is not known how the type and amount of information carried 
by feedback affect caudate activation.  To answer these questions, I examined brain activation 
during a feedback-based paired associate word learning task over three rounds of trials with two 
response options (Experiment 1) and over one round of trials with either two or four response 
options (Experiment 2).  The caudate nuclei were strongly engaged in Experiment 1 only during 
the second two rounds, when feedback reflected the accuracy of memory.  In Experiment 2, 
differential responses to positive and negative feedback were observed in the caudate nuclei in 
the 4-choice condition, for which positive feedback provides more information than negative 
feedback.  Responses to positive and negative feedback were not differential in the 2-choice 
condition and were similar in magnitude to the response elicited by positive feedback in the 4-
choice condition.  These results indicate that the caudate can be involved in feedback processing 
during tasks engaging declarative memory, but that activation during such tasks is context 
dependent.  The caudate is most strongly engaged when positive and negative feedback have 
differential value to the individual.  Though not required for learning to occur, caudate activation 
may nevertheless contribute to feedback-based declarative memory formation. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Feedback is a term borrowed from cybernetics, and is used to describe a process by 
which the effects of a response control that response (Hill, 1997).  In psychological studies of 
human behavior, the term describes stimuli used to signal performance accuracy, which can then 
be used to modify future performance (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  
Performance feedback not only serves to guide performance, but it also serves an emotive role 
since subjective feelings are induced by the “reward” or “punishment” of receiving positive or 
negative feedback (Elliott et al., 1998; Schultz et al., 1998).  Recent evidence implicates the 
striatum, and specifically the caudate nucleus, in feedback processing.  However, many questions 
about the neural basis of feedback-based learning remain unclear.  For instance, most work on 
the neural basis of feedback-based learning has utilized nondeclarative learning tasks, so the role 
that feedback may play in declarative learning is still unspecified.  The goal of the experiments 
presented here is to use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the influence 
of the caudate, as well as regions more typically engaged in declarative memory, on memory 
formation in a feedback-based declarative memory task.   
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1.1 THE ROLE OF THE STRIATUM IN FEEDBACK PROCESSING 
Although it has no extrinsic value, the intrinsic value of feedback may be quite potent to 
motivated learners.  If a shared neural system is involved in processing intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards and punishments, then feedback should engage neural mechanisms responsible for 
processing reward-related information.  The striatum is the input unit of the basal ganglia and has 
been implicated by both electrophysiological and imaging studies in the processing of primary 
and secondary rewards (Berns et al., 2001; Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 
2000b; Hikosaka et al., 1989; Knutson et al., 2000; Schultz, 1998).  The striatum receives 
dopaminergic inputs from the substantia nigra (Alexander et al., 1986) and ventral tegmental 
area (Robbins & Everitt, 1996), as well as afferents from the amygdala, hippocampal formation, 
and prefrontal cortex (Robbins & Everitt, 1996).  It sends information back to the prefrontal 
cortex by way of the globus pallidus (the output unit of the basal ganglia) and the thalamus, 
forming a frontal-striatal-thalamic loop (Alexander et al., 1986; Robbins & Everitt, 1996).  
Much emphasis has been placed on the importance of the dopaminergic projections from 
the midbrain to the striatum in the processing of reward-related information.  
Electrophysiological recording studies of dopamine neurons in monkeys demonstrate that they 
respond to unpredicted primary rewards such as food and fluid; however, if the reward is 
preceded by a conditioned, predictive stimulus, the neuronal activity occurs following this 
learned stimulus and is absent following the actual reward.  If a predicted reward does not 
actually occur, then the dopamine neurons are depressed at the time at which the predicted 
reward would have occurred.  These dopaminergic neurons, however, do not differentiate among 
different rewards (Schultz et al., 1998).  One hypothesis for the mechanism by which feedback 
may work is that dopamine released in the striatum may act as a reinforcement signal, allowing 
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behavior to be adaptively modulated to maximize future reward (Barto, 1995; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002; Montague & Berns, 2002; O'Doherty et al., 2004).   
Striatal neurons are activated during the expectation of predictable task events, with 
activity beginning after the predictive stimuli and ending immediately after the predicted event.  
Some of these neurons respond preferentially to certain types of rewards over others (e.g., apple 
juice vs. water), differentiating them from the nondiscriminating dopaminergic neurons (Schultz 
et al., 1998).  One study involving a visually-guided saccade task in monkeys found that the 
preferred direction of neurons in the caudate nucleus, a structure in the dorsal striatum, changed 
as a function of which direction was rewarded, showing that the activity of caudate neurons can 
be modulated over short time periods through expectation of reward (Kawagoe et al., 1998).  In 
humans, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that the caudate 
nucleus is activated by extrinsic monetary rewards (Delgado et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000b; 
Knutson et al., 2000).  The caudate differentiates between reward and punishment trials, showing 
sustained activation following feedback indicating a monetary gain and activity that tends to 
decrease below baseline following feedback indicating a monetary loss (Delgado et al., 2000).   
Neuroimaging studies confirm that the brain processes positive and negative feedback in 
a manner similar to the way it processes information about extrinsic rewards and punishments, 
such as money (e.g., Elliott et al., 1997; Tricomi et al., 2006).  However, the caudate could be 
involved in feedback processing without contributing to feedback-based learning.  For example, 
the caudate could simply be responding to the hedonic (pleasurable) aspects of the feedback.  
This appears, though, not to be the case.  The caudate does not exhibit robust activation in 
response to randomly delivered or cued monetary rewards and punishments.  Instead, it shows 
strong activation only when there is a perceived contingency between a response and the 
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outcome that follows the response (Tricomi et al., 2004).  As feedback-based learning requires 
such goal-directed action, the caudate could act to facilitate learning by linking actions with their 
consequences.  Recent neuroimaging studies support this idea.  For example, activation in the 
caudate nucleus during a probabilistic learning task was found to occur only when the task was 
feedback-based (Poldrack et al., 2001).  Moreover, performance of a perceptual learning task 
with feedback produced caudate activation and successful learning, while doing the same task 
with no feedback had neither of these effects (Tricomi et al., 2006).  In addition, caudate 
activation has been shown to vary as learning occurs; as contingencies between stimuli and 
correct responses become well-learned, caudate activation decreases (Delgado et al., 2005b; Law 
et al., 2005).  Finally, fMRI studies have shown that reversal learning, which involves learning 
new simulus-response-outcome contingencies and ignoring old ones, activates the caudate 
nucleus (O'Doherty et al., 2003; Rogers et al., 2000).   
This neuroimaging work is also complemented by neuropsychological work that indicates 
that patients with Parkinson’s disease and Huntington’s disease, which disrupt striatal function, 
are impaired on a variety of feedback-based nondeclarative learning tasks (Monchi et al., 2004; 
Packard & Knowlton, 2002; Seger, 1994; Shohamy et al., 2004).  One recent study showed that 
Parkinson’s patients were specifically impaired on a feedback-based version of a probabilistic 
category-learning task, but not a non-feedback version of the task (Shohamy et al., 2004).  
Parkinson’s patients are not impaired, however, on typical artificial grammar learning and 
prototype learning tasks, which involve category learning but do not involve feedback (Reber & 
Squire, 1999).  When artificial grammar learning tasks are modified to be feedback-based, then 
Parkinson’s patients do show deficits (Smith & McDowall, 2006).   
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1.2 THE ROLE OF THE STRIATUM IN NONDECLARATIVE LEARNING 
Thorndike, an early 20th century psychologist, did pioneering research on reinforcement 
learning, or in other words, on how outcomes of behavior serve to build up stimulus-response 
connections.  His research led him to come up with his influential “law of effect,” which states 
that "what comes after a connection acts upon it to alter its strength" (Thorndike, 1927).  
According to this law, how the strength of a stimulus-response (S-R) connection was altered 
depended on whether a “satisfier” or an “annoyer” followed the connection (Thorndike, 1911).  
Thorndike believed that S-R habits were slowly built up without the encoding of any information 
about the outcome, i.e., that a “satisfier” simply served to strengthen an S-R bond without any 
knowledge of a response-outcome contingency being learned (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; 
Dickinson & Balleine, 2002).   
This idea has had a pervasive influence on scientific thinking about how habit learning 
(i.e., the gradual building up of S-R associations) occurs (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Traditionally, 
the striatum has been thought to carry out the function of habit learning in much the way 
Thorndike originally proposed, by slowly strengthening S-R associations over many repetitions 
(e.g., Kantak et al., 2002; Kantak et al., 2001; McDonald & White, 1993).  Nevertheless, 
Thorndike’s view of a learning process that is blind to action-outcome contingency turns out to 
be false.  First, this idea doesn’t allow for motivational state (e.g., hunger) to modify behavior, 
but empirical evidence shows that changes in motivational state do affect behavior (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson & Balleine, 2002).  Second, the idea also fails because it predicts 
that as long as an S-R pairing is followed by a reward, the S-R bond should be strengthened, 
regardless of response-outcome (R-O) contingency.  That is, it predicts that if there are also 
presentations of the reward that don’t follow a response (which degrades the contingency 
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between the response and the outcome) this shouldn’t affect future responding.  In actuality, 
doing this depresses instrumental performance (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998).  Therefore, 
performance is sensitive to the information an outcome provides about the consequences of an 
action.   In other words, feedback is used to build up stimulus-response-outcome (S-R-O) 
associations.  So in actuality, the development of a habit consists of two distinct processes: one 
process, which involves goal-directed behavior (instrumental learning), and one which involves a 
frequency-based strengthening of a response (habit learning).  Early in learning, the former 
process dominates; if the contingencies between a response and outcome change, the animal will 
change its behavior (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998).  Eventually, however, the response to a 
stimulus becomes a true habit, and becomes independent of the outcome; the animal will 
continue to perform the same response, even if the outcome is devalued or omitted (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998; Cardinal et al., 2002; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; 
Yin et al., 2004).   
Recent evidence suggests that distinct subregions of the striatum may be preferentially 
involved in these two aspects of nondeclarative learning tasks.  In rats, the dorsomedial striatum 
(DMS), also referred to as “central striatum” (Bar-Gad et al., 2003; Haber et al., 2000), is 
roughly equivalent to the caudate in primates (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Although its precise role 
is not yet fully understood, recent work has shown it to be functionally distinct from dorsolateral 
striatum (DLS), the region roughly equivalent to the putamen in primates (Yin & Knowlton, 
2006).  Lesion studies provide support for the idea that the DMS is important for goal-directed 
action, while the DLS seems to subserve habit learning (Devan et al., 1999; Yin et al., 2004).   
For example, although normal taste aversion learning occurs, DLS-lesioned rats decrease lever 
pressing after taste aversion, unlike controls or DMS-lesioned rats, who continue to lever press.  
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This indicates a role of the DLS in maintaining S-R habits even in the face of altered 
contingencies (Yin et al., 2004).  Meanwhile, the DMS has been shown to be especially 
important for reversal learning tasks.  DMS lesions lead to regressive errors; that is, rats go back 
to performing an old response, even after a new correct response has been made (Ragozzino, 
2003).   
This evidence suggests that although the striatum is involved in the development and 
maintenance of habits, which are processes associated with nondeclarative learning, this function 
is complemented by another role of the striatum.  In particular, the DMS (or caudate in primates) 
seems to be involved in learning S-R-O contingencies, which is the basis of feedback-based 
learning.  Since these two functions appear to be distinct and to be subserved by distinct 
subregions of the striatum, they may not always go hand in hand.  In a situation that involves 
feedback-based learning, but does not rely exclusively on nondeclarative learning, the caudate 
could still be involved.  For example, through its strengthening of S-R-O associations, the 
caudate could act to make recall of correct responses less effortful, even when the responses 
involve semantic knowledge usually thought to be acquired via declarative memory.  
1.3 STRIATAL INFLUENCES ON THE DECLARATIVE MEMORY SYSTEM 
The striatum is not usually associated with declarative learning; instead, other brain 
regions, including the hippocampus and adjacent cortex within the medial temporal lobe (MTL), 
and the prefrontal cortex (PFC), are usually thought of as subserving declarative learning and 
memory.  The often profound deficits of amnesics with MTL damage on declarative memory 
tasks, along with their relatively preserved ability on nondeclarative memory tasks, underscores 
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the importance of the MTL for declarative memory in particular (Squire, 2004; Zola & Squire, 
2000).  Neuroimaging studies have indicated that the MTL is activated during both memory 
encoding and retrieval, although there is still some debate about whether different subregions are 
responsible for the two processes (Eldridge et al., 2005; Meltzer & Constable, 2005).  
Futhermore, activation levels in the hippocampus (Meltzer & Constable, 2005; Reber et al., 
2002) and  parahippocampus (Brewer et al., 1998; Reber et al., 2002; Wagner et al., 1998) during 
encoding have been found to correlate with performance on subsequent memory tests, and MTL 
activation during retrieval has also been found to be correlated with memory accuracy (Law et 
al., 2005; Meltzer & Constable, 2005; Wittmann et al., 2005).  Subsequent memory effects have 
also been found in the left inferior PFC for memory of words (Wagner et al., 1998), and right 
PFC for memory of pictures (Brewer et al., 1998).  The right PFC also appears to be involved in 
retrieval effort, with some studies showing increased PFC activation bilaterally during successful 
retrieval (Nyberg & Cabeza, 2000).  The functions of the MTL in memory appear to be 
independent of conscious effort, while activation in the PFC seems to reflect deliberate effort 
(Reber et al., 2002). 
There are several possibilities of how this system might act during feedback-based 
declarative learning tasks.  The declarative memory system could operate wholly autonomously 
from the striatal system, in which case both systems might be activated.  This activation could 
have a redundant effect on learning, so that the amount learned would be the same regardless of 
whether both systems were utilized, or the effects on learning could be additive, in which case 
more would be learned than if only one of the systems were utilized.  Conversely, the two neural 
systems could interact.  Activation of one system could inhibit activation of the other, or 
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conceivably the two systems could act synergistically, so that activation of one system would 
potentiate activation in the other.   
Each of these possibilities has garnered some support.  Squire argues that different 
memory systems operate “independently and in parallel” (Squire, 2004).  In other words, 
multiple types of memory formation can occur at the same time by different memory systems.  
One type of memory may seem to dominantly affect behavior, but if the region responsible for 
the dominant behavior is inactivated, other behavioral strategies will emerge that make it clear 
that other brain regions have also acquired a memory, in a different form.  For example, when a 
rat uses a declarative strategy to return to a rewarded location rather than to perform the action 
that was rewarded (e.g., a left turn), this strategy choice becomes reversed when the 
hippocampus is inactivated with lidocaine injections (Packard & McGaugh, 1996).  Likewise, 
one recent neuropsychology study found that two patients with MTL lesions and profound 
declarative memory impairments were nevertheless able to slowly acquire a feedback-based 
discrimination learning task that control subjects learn quickly with a declarative memory 
strategy, presumably by making use of a striatal learning system (Bayley et al., 2005).  These 
studies leave open the question, however, of whether for humans with no brain damage, the 
striatum and MTL would be employed simultaneously during tasks such as these.       
An alternate view is expressed by Poldrack and Rodriguez (2004), who argue that the 
striatal and hippocampal systems interact competitively, whereby when one system is active it 
suppresses activity in the other, with the PFC mediating this interaction.  This view is supported 
by a neuroimaging study, in which an inverse relationship was found between activation in the 
caudate and medial temporal lobe.  In a typical weather-prediction task with feedback (a 
probabilistic, nondeclarative learning task), initial MTL activation quickly decreased, and the 
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caudate nucleus became activated.  In a paired-associate version of the task, designed to engage 
declarative memory, activation was greater in the MTL and less in the caudate than for the 
feedback-based version of the task (Poldrack et al., 2001).  However, since there was no 
condition involving a declarative memory task with feedback, it is impossible to tell whether the 
inverse relationship between caudate and MTL activation would persist in such a situation.   
Finally, some have argued for the third point of view, that is, that the brain’s dopamine-
mediated reward system, which is usually associated with the striatum’s role in learning and 
memory, facilitates hippocampus-dependent memory formation (Wittmann et al., 2005).   Neural 
circuitry supports the idea that the hippocampus and striatum may interact.  Cells in the nucleus 
accumbens, a structure in the ventral striatum, receive excitatory input from the hippocampus.  
The nucleus accumbens inhibits the globus pallidus (ventral pallidum), releasing its tonic 
inhibition of the ventral tegmental area (VTA), a part of the midbrain containing dopaminergic 
neurons (Lisman & Grace, 2005).  Although there are no direct projections between the 
hippocampus and dorsal striatum, the dorsal striatum is interconnected with the substantia nigra 
(Haber et al., 2000), a part of the midbrain which, along with the VTA, sends dopaminergic 
projections to the hippocampus (Lisman & Grace, 2005).  Functionally, the MTL and nucleus 
accumbens have been shown to exhibit greater activation when there is high motivation to learn 
than when there is low motivation (Adcock et al., 2006).  Furthermore, long-term, incidental 
memory of reward-associated cues has been found to be greater than memory for neutral cues, 
indicating a facilitatory effect of reward-related activation on long-term memory (Wittmann et 
al., 2005).   
Given the varying viewpoints present in the literature, the issue of the striatum’s potential 
influence on the declarative memory system warrants further investigation.  One goal of the 
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research presented in this thesis was to address this issue by imaging the brain during execution 
of a feedback-based declarative memory paradigm. 
1.4 MODULATION OF CAUDATE ACTIVATION DURING FEEDBACK-BASED 
DECLARATIVE LEARNING 
Much remains to be known about which aspects of feedback processing determine 
caudate activation.  Such activation is not consistent across all tasks involving feedback, but 
instead seems to be modulated by a number of factors.  For example, the caudate nucleus is 
recruited only when participants perceive that there is a contingency between their action and 
whether they subsequently receive a reward or punishment (Tricomi et al., 2004).  Therefore, 
feedback might be expected to more strongly activate the caudate when learners feel a strong 
sense of agency in determining the outcome.  If the learner has no prior knowledge of the task, 
and therefore no basis on which to choose a response, the caudate might be less strongly 
activated than when the feedback is a true assessment of performance. 
Another, potentially related, factor that has been found to modulate caudate activation is 
the value of feedback to the individual.  In the animal literature, this is sometimes termed the 
“incentive value” of an outcome, and can be thought of as the degree to which it is goal-worthy; 
this value is not absolute, but may change as a function of motivational state (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994).  Nothing about 
feedback displays (e.g., green checkmarks) is intrinsically rewarding.  It is the meaning in 
relation to the task that endows feedback with value.  Notably, however, the goals of obtaining 
positive feedback and improving performance are not identical (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  
11 
Therefore, the perceived value of feedback should be modulated by whether it provides 
meaningful information about performance.   
The perceived value of an outcome is also affected by the other possible outcomes.  
Studies of “counterfactual comparisons” indicate that reward-related brain regions respond to an 
outcome’s value relative to the alternative outcomes, rather than to its absolute value (Breiter et 
al., 2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Ursu & Carter, 2005).  For example, when the alternative is 
a monetary gain, winning no money produces a punishment response in reward-sensitive brain 
regions, including the caudate nucleus, while the same outcome produces a reward response 
when the alternative is a monetary loss (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005).   
 Another factor that could alter the perceived value of feedback is the amount of task-
related information provided by feedback.  Performance-related information indicates whether 
the participant’s response is accurate or inaccurate, while task-related information indicates 
which response is accurate.  Positive feedback indicates that the response chosen is the accurate 
one, while negative feedback eliminates that response from the possible accurate responses.  The 
use of a declarative memory task allows for the amount of information provided by feedback to 
be easily operationalized, since the relationships between the stimuli, responses, and outcomes 
can be clearly delineated and made obvious to the learner.  For the purposes of this thesis, I will 
use as a definition of information the difference between the probability of the learner answering 
correctly on trial t+1 and trial t, given perfect memory.  For example, on trial 1 of a given 
problem that has two possible response options and no prior knowledge of which is correct, the 
chance of answering correctly is 0.5.  Feedback either confirms the guess or eliminates the 
response from the set of responses that could be accurate.  On trial 2 of the same problem, given 
accurate memory of the information provided by the feedback on trial 1, the chance of answering 
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correctly is now 1.0.  The probability of answering correctly has increased by 0.5, and this can be 
taken as a measure of the amount of information provided by the feedback. 
Based on this definition, the amount of information provided by positive feedback 
increases with more response options, or in other words, as the chance of answering correctly 
decreases.  Conversely, negative feedback provides the most information with only two possible 
options.  In both cases, it is when the type of feedback deviates most from expectation that it is 
most informative.  Indeed, the dopaminergic system seems to be sensitive to this measure.  
Midbrain dopamine neurons, which project to the striatum, have been found to fire in proportion 
to how expected a reward is.  Unexpected rewards produce the most firing, while firing in 
anticipation of an upcoming reward increases as rewards become more expected (Fiorillo et al., 
2003).  Further studies have found that reward-related activity in the striatum is greatest when 
the reward is unpredictable (Berns et al., 2001; McClure et al., 2003).  Finally, once a task is 
well-learned, feedback becomes completely expected, and therefore ceases to provide 
information.  Consistent with the idea that the striatum in sensitive to the informational value of 
feedback is the finding that activity in the caudate nuclei appears to decrease over the course of 
learning (Delgado et al., 2005b; Haruno et al., 2004; Law et al., 2005; Pasupathy & Miller, 
2005).   
In this thesis, I describe two experiments that I performed to examine the role of the 
caudate in processing performance feedback and how this processing may contribute to the 
learning process.  In Experiment 1, changes in caudate activation were examined over the initial 
stages of learning.  The brains of participants were scanned as they encountered the same trials 
of an arbitrary paired associate learning task with feedback three times.  Experiment 2 examined 
how the number of response options in a feedback-based declarative memory task affects 
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activation in the caudate during learning.  Participants were scanned while performing the task 
with trials that had 2 or 4 response options, allowing me to compare the effects of feedback that 
carries different amounts of information.   
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2.0  EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF THE TYPE OF INFORMATION 
PROVIDED BY FEEDBACK ON CAUDATE ACTIVATION 
 
The head of the caudate nucleus, which lies within the dorsal striatum, has been 
implicated in processing reward-related information (Delgado et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000b; 
Knutson et al., 2000), including the processing of performance-related feedback (e.g., (Elliott et 
al., 1997; Poldrack et al., 2001; Tricomi et al., 2006).  However, little is known about the specific 
role that the caudate is playing in feedback-based learning.  The goal of this experiment was to 
examine the parameters that govern feedback-related caudate activation. 
Feedback provides multiple types of information.  First, it provides information about 
what the correct response is.  Second, it can serve as an indication of task success.  It is unclear 
whether feedback-related caudate activation discriminates between these two types of 
information.  To examine this issue, this experiment made use of a feedback-based paired 
associate word-learning task, in which participants encountered the same sets of trials three 
times.  The task was set up in a “multiple choice” format, with a target word and two choices of 
possible words for the second half of the pair. The participants began with no prior knowledge of 
the correct pairings, which were arbitrary.  On the first trial of this task, they were required to 
pick an answer and learn based on feedback whether the response guessed was correct.  The 
second time they encountered the same trial, they tried to retrieve the memory of the correct 
answer and respond accordingly, and feedback indicated whether their answer was correct.  Note 
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that feedback is serving two different functions during these two memory stages.  Since the word 
pairs were arbitrary, performance was also arbitrary during the initial encoding stage.  At this 
point, feedback provides information about what the correct answer is, but does not provide an 
indication of task success.  That is, learners are aware that negative feedback is not a reflection 
of poor performance, but instead, only of bad luck.  In fact, with only two response options, the 
correct answer can be determined from either negative or positive feedback.  Therefore, the two 
outcomes may not be perceived as having differential value.  This is one case in which the goal 
of mastering a task is not related to obtaining positive feedback.  In contrast, feedback during 
later, “retrieval” trials provides an assessment of memory performance, and consequently of task 
success.  In this instance, positive feedback may be perceived as more rewarding than negative 
feedback. 
The main hypothesis tested in this experiment was that caudate activation would be 
higher the second time each participant encountered a particular trial than the first.  This 
hypothesis was based on several previous findings related to reward processing in the caudate.  
First, there is some evidence to suggest that the caudate should be more activated when 
participants feel a strong sense of agency in determining the outcome.  Specifically, in a guessing 
task with monetary outcomes, the caudate was recruited only when participants believed that 
there was a contingency between their action and whether they subsequently received a reward 
or punishment (Tricomi et al., 2004).  If a learner has no prior knowledge of the task, and 
therefore no basis on which to choose a response, the caudate might be less strongly activated 
than when the feedback is a true assessment of performance. 
Another factor that has been found to modulate caudate activation is the value of 
feedback to the individual.  In a guessing task, the caudate responded much more strongly when 
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feedback indicated monetary gain or loss than when there were no monetary incentives (Delgado 
et al., 2004).  However, in a learning study in which feedback indicated performance accuracy 
but had no monetary value, robust caudate activation was also observed (Tricomi et al., 2006).  
In this case, the goal of participants was to learn to perform well on the task, rather than to earn 
money, so positive feedback was valued highly because it provided information about 
achievement of this goal.  When the information provided by positive and negative feedback is 
equivalent and unrelated to task success, it may not have much value to the learner, and therefore 
may not robustly activate the caudate.  In contrast, the caudate may activate more strongly on 
trials involving memory retrieval, since feedback then provides information about the degree to 
which the learner’s goal of mastering the task has been achieved.   
Finally, once a task is well-learned, feedback becomes completely expected, and 
therefore ceases to provide information.  At this point, positive feedback may become less 
rewarding.  Several studies have found that reward-related activity in the striatum is greatest 
when the reward is unpredictable (Berns et al., 2001; McClure et al., 2003).  Further studies have 
indicated that activity in the caudate nuclei appears to decrease over the course of learning 
(Delgado et al., 2005b; Haruno et al., 2004; Law et al., 2005; Pasupathy & Miller, 2005).  These 
findings led to a second hypothesis that caudate activation might be somewhat attenuated on the 
third round of trials, as feedback is beginning to become more expected.  
2.1 METHODS 
2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty healthy, right-handed adults were recruited through posted advertisements and 
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were paid $57 for their participation in the experiment.  Of these participants, four were excluded 
from analysis due to excessive head movement, one was excluded due to a technical problem, 
and four were excluded due to ceiling performance.  Data from the remaining eleven subjects 
were analyzed (5 women, 6 men; mean age ± SD, 21.9 ± 2.3) All participants signed an informed 
consent form according to the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pittsburgh. 
2.1.2 Materials 
A 3 Tesla Siemens head-only scanner and standard radio frequency coil was used for all 
the MR scanning sessions. Stimulus presentation and behavioral data acquisition was controlled 
using “E-prime” software (Schneider et al., 2002) and the integrated function imaging system 
(IFIS) [Pittsburgh, PA].   
2.1.3 Procedure 
Scan session: 
 Structural images were collected using a standard T1-weighted pulse sequence, in thirty-
eight contiguous slices (3.125 x 3.125 x 3.0 mm voxels) parallel to the AC-PC line.  Thiry-eight 
functional images were collected in the same locations as the structural slices.  They were 
acquired using a one-shot echo-planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence [TR=2000 ms, TE=25 ms, 
FOV=20 cm, flip angle = 79°]. 
 
Behavioral paradigm: 
This experiment involved a paired associate word learning task, and participants were 
scanned as they performed 3 rounds of trials on this task, that is, the initial encoding round, and 
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two subsequent rounds, which may include memory retrieval as well as further encoding.  
Participants received performance-dependent feedback following each trial throughout the scan 
session.   
The scan session consisted of nine six-minute runs, divided conceptually into three 
rounds of 60 trials.  Each trial was 18 s long.  On each trial of Round 1 (the first three runs), 
participants saw a target word and two choices of possible word matches, labeled “a)” and “b)” 
(Figure 1).  The words contained 4-8 letters and 1-2 syllables, had Kucera-Francis frequencies of 
20-650 words per million, and had high imagibility ratings (score of over 400 according to the 
MRC database; (Coltheart, 1981).  The words were matched for word length and frequency at 
the trial level.  Additionally, words presented on the same trial were not semantically related, 
with a score of less than 0.2 on the Latent Semantic Analysis similarity matrix (Landauer et al., 
1998) and did not rhyme or begin with the same letter.   Participants were asked to guess which 
response word went with the target word by pressing one of two buttons on a response glove.  
Since the words were unrelated, guesses were arbitrary.  Participants had 4 s to respond, after 
which the display was replaced by a feedback display, which was shown for 1 s (Figure 1).  On 
50% of trials, participants received positive feedback following their response (3 green √s ), 
indicating they guessed correctly, and on the other 50% of trials, participants received negative 
feedback (3 red Xs), indicating they guessed incorrectly.  If the subject made no response, three 
white hyphens were shown and the trial was excluded from analysis.  Participants were asked to 
use the feedback to try to remember the correct word pairs (the correct pairings remained 
consistent throughout each scanning session, although which item was the correct one was 
chosen randomly for each participant).  Each trial ended with a 13 s delay period in which 
participants fixated on a white cross in the center of the screen.  Participants were not given any 
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constraints or advice on how to remember the word pairs.  
On Round 2, the same 60 trials were repeated, in random order, with the position of the 
response options chosen randomly (i.e., which was choice “a” and which was choice “b”).    
Although the procedure was the same, it should be noted that participants’ guesses were no 
longer arbitrary; instead, participants were asked to pick the correct response based on the 
feedback they received during Round 1.  Feedback was again presented after each trial, 
indicating whether the participant answered correctly or incorrectly.  Finally, on Round 3, the 
procedure from Round 2 was repeated, with the same sixty trials presented in random order.   
Following the scan, participants took a computerized post-test, using the E-prime 
program, in which the 60 trials were repeated one more time, with no feedback.  Following each 
trial, participants were asked to make a confidence judgment by choosing a number from 1-7 (1 
= complete guess, 7 = completely sure).  The post-test was self-paced, unlike the trials during the 
scan.  Approximately one week later (7-9 days following the scan session), participants returned 
to the lab and completed the post-test a second time, with the exception of one participant, who 
never returned.   
2.1.4 Data Analysis 
Behavioral Data 
 Analyses were performed on the behavioral data of the participants who were used in the 
fMRI data analyses.  One-sample t-tests were used on the accuracy data from each round and the 
post-tests to determine which conditions differed from chance.  A repeated measures ANOVA 
was performed with subject as a random factor and round as a within-subjects factor to 
determine if accuracy changed over the course of the experiment.  A similar ANOVA was 
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performed to assess whether reaction time changed over the course of the scanning session.  
Two-tailed t-tests were used to determine whether reaction time and/or confidence differed 
between correct and incorrect trials.  Finally, a linear regression of reaction time on confidence 
was fit for the post-test data to determine whether reaction time differed as a function of 
confidence.   
 
FMRI Data 
The NeuroImaging Software package (NIS 3.5), developed at the University of 
Pittsburgh and Princeton University, was used to analyze the fMRI data.  Images were 
reconstructed and corrected for subject motion with Automated Image Registration (AIR 3.08; 
(Woods et al., 1992).  Subjects with head motion that exceeded 4 mm or degrees in any direction 
were not used in the analysis.  The images were detrended to adjust for scanner drift within runs.  
The structural images of each subject were stripped to remove the skull and co-registered to a 
common reference brain (chosen from among the participants; (Woods et al., 1993).  Functional 
images were transformed into the same common space, normalized by a mean scaling of each 
image to match global mean image intensity across subjects, and smoothed using a three-
dimensional Gaussian filter (8 mm FWHM) to account for anatomical differences between 
subjects.  This set of data was then analyzed statistically. 
A voxel-wise analysis was performed on the fMRI data, through a repeated-measures 
three-way ANOVA with subject as a random factor and accuracy (correct vs. incorrect), round 
(1-3), and time period (2 s time periods T1-T9) as within-subject factors.  As mentioned above, 
four participants were excluded from analysis because they showed a ceiling effect; they had 
fewer than 8 incorrect trials for Round 3.  Regions of interest (ROIs) were defined as regions 
with four or more contiguous voxels showing a significant effect; this contiguity threshold 
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served as a precaution against type-1 errors (Forman et al., 1995).  All ROIs were transformed 
into Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) using the AFNI program (Cox, 1996).   
Further analysis focused on whether levels of activation during Round 1 predicted 
accuracy on Round 2 (Wagner et al., 1999).  To do this, trials were coded according to the 
accuracy for the identical trial on the following round.  A repeated measures ANOVA was then 
performed with subject as a random factor and current round accuracy (correct vs. incorrect), 
future accuracy (correct vs. incorrect), and time (2 s time periods T1-T9) as within-subject 
factors.  To increase the power of this analysis, data from participants whose performance was at 
ceiling on Round 3 were included, as was data from the three participants who were excluded 
from the main analysis due to excessive movement, since the movement occurred after Round 1; 
thus, n = 19 for this analysis.  A similar analysis was not performed on the data from Rounds 2 
and 3, since if performance is accurate on any given trial on Round 2, it is more likely to be 
accurate subsequently as well, and so effects due to performance and to learning are confounded 
on these rounds.    
2.2 RESULTS 
2.2.1 Behavioral Results 
Table 1 lists the mean accuracy and reaction times for each round in the scanner and the 
two post-tests.  With the exception of Round 1, which was programmed so that each participant 
would receive positive feedback 50% of the time, performance was significantly better than 
chance, indicating that learning occurred.  A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that accuracy 
changed over the course of the experiment (F(4,39.3) = 56.7, p < 0.05).  Reaction time did not 
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differ significantly over the three rounds in the scanner (F(2,20) = 1.57, p > 0.05).  Reaction 
times during the scan session were not compared to post-test reaction times, since the post-tests 
were self-paced. 
Two-tailed t-tests showed no significant differences between reaction times for correct 
and incorrect trials on Rounds 1 and 2, but significant differences on Round 3 and the two post-
tests, with faster times for correct trials (Table 2).  Confidence was significantly greater for 
correct trials than incorrect trials on both post-tests (Table 3).  Finally, increases in confidence 
judgments were associated with decreases in reaction time; mixed model linear regression 
analyses of reaction time on confidence, with subject as a random factor, showed this effect to be 
significant for both post-tests (F(6, 641) = 13.8 and F(6, 581) = 5.5, for post-tests 1 and 2, 
respectively, p < 0.05).    
2.2.2 fMRI Results 
A voxel-wise ANOVA with subject as a random factor and round (1-3), accuracy (correct 
vs. incorrect), and time period (2 s time periods T1-T9) as within-subject factors was performed.   
The resulting activation clusters showing a Round by Time effect, at a threshold of p < 0.0001 
and a contiguity threshold of four voxels (cf. Tricomi et al., 2004), are listed in Table 4 and 
shown in Figure 2.  Although there were subtle differences in activation between Rounds 2 and 
3, the most salient differences were between Round 1 activation and the activation during the 
other two rounds.  Some regions showed more activation for Round 1 than Rounds 2 and 3, 
while other regions showed greater activation for Rounds 2 and 3 than Round 1 (Table 4).  A 
region was identified in the caudate nuclei that showed the latter pattern, with a flat response 
during Round 1 and an increase in the response during Rounds 2 and 3 (Figure 3).  The response 
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is greatest for Round 2, with a slight attenuation for Round 3.  One might expect these 
differences to be most apparent at the response peak, which occurs at T3, 4-6 s after the trial 
start.  Levels of activation at this time point represent the magnitude of the initial rise in 
activation that occurs even before the feedback display; due to the sluggishness of the 
hemodynamic response in the brain, one would not expect outcome-related effects on the BOLD 
signal to occur until several seconds after the feedback presentation.  Pairwise two-tailed t-tests 
performed on time point T3 revealed significant differences between Rounds 1 and 2 (t(10) = -
4.0, p < 0.05) and between Rounds 1 and 3 (t(10) = -2.5, p < 0.05), with a trend towards 
significance between Rounds 2 and 3 (t(10) = 1.9, p < 0.1).    
The activation clusters showing an Accuracy by Time effect at p < 0.0001 are listed in 
Table 5 and shown in Figure 4.  Bilateral activation was found in the ventral head of the caudate.  
The significance threshold was raised until the caudate region separated from contiguous 
regions, and the time courses of activation, shown separately for each round, are depicted in 
Figure 5.  Although the time course of activation during Round 1 is relatively flat, there is a 
slight differentiation between trials with positive and negative feedback, with the activation 
dipping slightly below baseline following negative feedback.  For Rounds 2 and 3, after an initial 
rise, the signal following negative feedback shows a pronounced dip below baseline, whereas the 
signal following positive feedback does not.  In previous work, the BOLD signal has shown 
significant differentiation between correct and incorrect trials 6-9 s after the feedback display 
(Tricomi et al., 2006).  This corresponds to T6 and T7 in the current experiment.  Two-tailed t-
tests were performed on these time points for each round.  Significant differences were found at 
T6 on Round 1 (t(10) = 2.3, p < 0.05); at T6 and T7 on Round 2 (t(10) = 6.0 and 3.8, 
respectively, p < 0.05), and at T6 and T7 on Round 3 (t(10) = 7.9 and 4.4, respectively, p < 0.05). 
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The activation clusters showing a three-way Round by Accuracy by Time effect at p < 
0.0001 are listed in Table 6 and shown in Figure 6.  In general, the difference between correct 
and incorrect trials was greatest on Round 3, with some clusters exhibiting more activation for 
correct trials than incorrect trials and some showing the reverse pattern.  The only clusters of 
activation showing a significant three-way interaction in the caudate were in the caudate body, 
whereas the clusters showing Round by Time and Accuracy by Time effects were observed in 
the head of the caudate.  The activation pattern in the caudate body clusters shows a distinct 
pattern of activation.  Activation is elicited on all three rounds, with an earlier response on 
correct trials than on incorrect trials during Round 3, but not Rounds 1 and 2 (Figure 7).   
By far the largest cluster showing the three-way interaction was in the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).  The time course from this region, 
plotted by Round, is shown in Figure 8.  Although there were separate peaks in the DLPFC and 
IFG, when the threshold was raised to isolate these subregions, they were found to show similar 
activation patterns; thus the time course from the larger region has been plotted.  While incorrect 
trials show greater activation than correct trials on all three rounds, the signal most strongly 
differentiates on Round 3. 
Although the hippocampus/parahippocampus did not show any significant interactions, it 
did show a very strong main effect of time, bilaterally (peak Talairach coordinates: -27, -16, -12 
and 23, -12, -15).  The threshold was increased to isolate the hippocampal activation clusters 
from contiguous activated regions.  These clusters are shown in Figure 9, along with the time 
courses of activation.  The signal decreases from trial onset, and recovers following the feedback 
display.  This recovery is increasingly slower following negative feedback as round increases.   
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Previous research has indicated that the parahippocampal/fusiform gyrus and the 
prefrontal cortex are more active when successful encoding is taking place, as measured by 
performance on a subsequent memory test (Brewer et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998).  To see if a 
similar effect was present in the current task, the data on Round 1 were coded by whether the 
participant would answer correctly on the corresponding trial on Round 2, and an ANOVA was 
performed to identify regions showing a Future Accuracy X Time effect.  No regions were 
identified at the significance threshold of p < 0.0001, with a cluster threshold of 4 voxels.  An 
exploratory analysis at a threshold of p < 0.001, however, did reveal regions similar to those 
found in previous work that displayed greater activation on trials associated with subsequent 
correct performance than on trials associated with subsequent incorrect performance.   
Specifically, such regions included the left fusiform gyrus (peak Talairach coordinates: -50, -43, 
-9), left posterior lateral inferior frontal gyrus (peak Talairach coordinates: -40, -1, 29), and the 
left middle frontal gyrus (peak Talairach coordinates: -47, 21, 26), with a location superior to the 
anterior lateral inferior frontal gyrus area found to show a subsequent memory effect in previous 
work (cf. Wagner et al., 1998).  No regions were identified in the striatum or the hippocampus.   
Finally, to test the idea that an increased signal in the caudate on correct trials might act 
to decrease reaction time on the subsequent trial (by increasing confidence and making the 
retrieval of the correct response more automatic), the Round 2 trials for which performance was 
accurate on both Rounds 2 and 3 were coded by the difference in reaction time between the two 
rounds.  A median split was used to divide the trials into those with a large reaction time 
decrease versus a small reaction time decrease (or an increase in some cases).  Although no 
clusters showing a reaction time difference by time effect were identified in the caudate nuclei at 
a threshold of p < 0.0001, an exploratory analysis with a threshold of p < 0.001 did identify a 
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cluster in the right ventral caudate nucleus (peak Talairach coordinates: -8, 6, 0).  The activation 
peak was higher for trials with a subsequently large reaction time decrease than for a small 
reaction time decrease.  At this threshold, other regions also showed a reaction time difference 
by time effect, including the midbrain, right cuneus, right postcentral gyrus, and right superior 
cerebellum.   
2.3 DISCUSSION 
The main finding of this experiment is that the head of the caudate is more robustly 
activated when feedback indicates task success, rather than when it is purely informational.  
Although the same sixty trials were repeated three times, the resulting activation in the caudate, 
as well as other brain regions, was quite different.  This discussion will focus on activation in the 
caudate and MTL; a discussion of the role of other brain regions involved in this experiment and 
Experiment 2 is covered in the final chapter of this thesis.  On Round 1, when feedback was 
arbitrarily related to performance, the BOLD signal in the caudate head did not rise above 
baseline.  There was a significant rise in activation on Round 2, once feedback began to reflect 
task performance.  In other words, feedback was then serving as an indication of whether the 
learner was performing well or poorly.  Learners may have felt that if they received negative 
feedback, it was their “fault” for not remembering the word pair accurately.  In contrast, they 
knew that since there was no way to tell in advance of the experiment what the correct pairs 
were, that they would receive negative feedback approximately 50% of the time during Round 1, 
no matter what.  The caudate, then, does not seem to process feedback indiscriminately; the 
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meaning of the feedback in relation to the participant’s goals and expectations plays a crucial 
role in the response of the caudate.     
A second finding was that although the caudate response was still significantly greater on 
Round 3 than on Round 1, the magnitude of the rise was somewhat attenuated from the signal 
rise on Round 2.  This fits within the context of other experiments that have shown diminished 
activity in the caudate as appropriate responses become well-learned (Delgado et al., 2005b; 
Haruno et al., 2004; Law et al., 2005; Pasupathy & Miller, 2005).  In the present experiment, 
correct performance was already at 75% for Round 3.  One reason for the attenuation effect may 
be that as correct responses become well-learned, positive feedback becomes more expected.  
Therefore, it carries less information about performance.  In other words, if a learner is already 
highly confident that a particular response is correct, positive feedback does not tell the learner 
anything new.  If, on the other hand, the learner has only a “hunch” that a given response is 
correct, positive feedback confirms that hunch, and in doing so provides performance-related 
information that the learner wouldn’t have known otherwise. 
Supporting this idea is the fact that reaction time begins to significantly differ between 
correct and incorrect responses on Round 3.  On the post-tests, confidence and reaction time 
were inversely correlated; participants tended to respond more quickly on trials for which they 
were most confident.  We can assume that this effect was true during the scanning session as 
well, so although explicit measures of confidence were not obtained during the scanning session, 
reaction time can be used as a proxy for confidence.  Therefore, that reaction times were faster 
for correct trials than incorrect trials during Round 3 is an indication that participants were more 
confident of their correct responses.  In contrast, on Round 2, no such effect exists, indicating 
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that although performance was above chance, participants may not yet have been more confident 
of their correct responses than their incorrect responses. 
If activity in the caudate nucleus is contributing to learning, then one might expect that 
confidence would increase more when the caudate signal is greatest.  Indeed, there was some 
evidence that this was the case.  If reaction time tracks inversely with confidence, then large 
decreases in reaction time should signify increases in confidence, relative to small decreases or 
increases.  The right caudate nucleus did show greater peak activation on correct trials during 
Round 2 that were associated with a large decrease in reaction time on Round 3.  Although this 
effect was found at an exploratory significance threshold, it raises the intriguing possibility that 
caudate activation may act to solidify response-outcome knowledge.  Over repeated trials, such 
activation could potentially automatize responding, such that it becomes more habitual.   
As in other studies of reward-related processing, the signal in the caudate nucleus 
differentiates between positive and negative outcomes in this experiment (e.g., Delgado et al., 
2000; Tricomi et al., 2006).  Specifically, there is a greater signal on trials with positive feedback 
than negative feedback.  There are, however, some subtle, yet interesting, differences between 
the pattern observed in this experiment compared to prior experiments.  Previous experiments 
have shown a sustained response to outcomes indicating monetary rewards or correct 
performance, while the response to monetary loss or negative feedback decreases sharply, even 
dipping below baseline activation in some cases.  In this experiment, for Rounds 2 and 3, which 
show the greater overall response in the caudate, the response to positive feedback returns to 
baseline relatively quickly following the response peak.  It does not dip below baseline, but 
neither is the response particularly sustained.  By time point T5 (4-6 s after the onset of the 
feedback display) the response has returned to the baseline level, whereas in other work the 
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“reward” signal remains elevated until about 9 s after the outcome display (cf. Tricomi et al., 
2006; Tricomi et al., 2004).  The signal following negative feedback, on the other hand, shows 
an exaggerated dip below baseline on Rounds 2 and 3 (-0.13% decrease, compared to -0.06% in 
prior work; cf. Tricomi et al., 2004)).  This may be attributed to the fact that learning occurred 
quickly in this task, so that even by Round 2 performance was above chance.  In previous work, 
performance remained at or near chance throughout the scanning session.  As discussed above, 
caudate activation seems to be related to the participant’s expectations of the possible outcome.  
The more a reward is expected, the less “rewarding” it may seem, and the sustained activation 
that seems to define a “reward” response may be attenuated.  Conversely, the more a reward is 
expected, the more unexpected a punishment response would be, and so the defining dip of a 
“punishment” response may increase in magnitude. 
Though not the focus of this study, the body of the caudate showed an interesting pattern 
of activation, which was different from that observed in the head of the caudate.  Specifically, 
the caudate body showed a signal that increased from baseline on all rounds, and this signal 
emerged later in time course than for the caudate head.  Differences in the signal for correct and 
incorrect trials began to emerge as Round increased.  Late in the time course, the signal became 
greater for incorrect trials compared to correct trials, while on Round 3, the signal rose more 
quickly for correct than incorrect trials.  Previous work has also suggested that the activity of the 
body of the caudate is distinct from that of the caudate head (Seger & Cincotta, 2005).  This 
work showed an increased response in the caudate body over many trials of training on a 
classification task with feedback, with greater activation on correct than incorrect trials late in 
training.  It is possible that the results of the present study show the beginnings of performance-
related differences in the signal produced by the caudate body, which might continue to evolve 
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with more training.  However, further research will be required to pinpoint the functional role of 
this region relative to the caudate head.  
Unlike most studies investigating feedback-based learning, this experiment utilized a task 
involving declarative memory acquisition.  This is not to say that nondeclarative learning was 
not also taking place; however, the task differed in many respects from tasks designed to 
primarily engage nondeclarative memory and was instead similar to tasks designed to engage 
declarative memory.  For example, rather than requiring many trials for correct responses to 
slowly be acquired, as is typical of nondeclarative learning, learning occurred quickly in this 
experiment, with performance significantly above chance after only one presentation of the 60 
trials.  Additionally, participants were quite aware of what it was they were learning, whereas for 
many nondeclarative learning tasks, performance improves without conscious knowledge of 
what marks the right response.  The results of this experiment argue against a competitive 
systems view of “declarative” and “nondeclarative” brain systems, with activity in the 
hippocampus and striatum showing an inverse relationship.  During each round of this 
experiment, the hippocampus showed a significant, albeit decreasing, response on each trial.  
Decreasing responses in the hippocampus are not unusual, and have been attributed to activity 
during “rest” that is higher than activity during the task itself (Stark & Squire, 2001).  Indeed, 
during this task, the participants may well have been engaging in associative strategies to try to 
remember the word pairs during the intertrial intervals, causing hippocampal activation, which 
may have then paused during the beginning of the trial proper as they responded to the new trial 
and waited for the feedback, resulting in a decreasing response.  Meanwhile, after responding 
very little on Round 1, the caudate was active on Round 2 and 3.  If activity in the two brain 
regions were inversely related, we would expect that either the caudate would not be engaged at 
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all in this experiment, or that the hippocampus would no longer be engaged once the striatum 
was recruited.  Instead, it appears that both regions can be engaged simultaneously.  There is 
some evidence that the hippocampus, like the caudate, was modulated by feedback valence and 
round, in that the recovery of the hippocampal response back to baseline is increasingly slower 
following negative feedback on Rounds 2 and 3.  However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the caudate was causing this modulation, and so the results of this experiment leave open the 
possibility that the two brain regions act independently. 
It is important to note that the caudate does not appear to be processing the information 
provided by the feedback about which of the response options is correct.  If it were, then either it 
would be active during Round 1, or no learning would take place during Round 1.  However, 
performance is significantly above chance on Round 2, despite the caudate’s lack of response on 
Round 1.  Therefore, other brain regions must be able to process the information provided by the 
feedback about which response is correct to support learning of the appropriate word pairs.  
Indeed, brain regions that have been found to show subsequent memory effects in other 
declarative memory tasks, such as the left prefrontal cortex and left fusiform gyrus (Brewer et 
al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998), showed a similar effect during Round 1 of this task, whereas the 
caudate did not.  Caudate activation, it appears, is not necessary for feedback-based learning to 
occur, at least in some situations.  
What role, then, does the caudate play in feedback-based learning, if it is not necessary to 
process the information it provides about which response is the correct one?  The results from 
this experiment suggest that it is processing a different kind of information, that is, information 
about task performance.  The goal of the participants in this experiment is not to obtain positive 
feedback per se, but to learn the correct word pairings.  Positive feedback seems to yield a 
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reward response and negative feedback a punishment response only inasmuch as they are related 
to whether the goal is being achieved.  Feedback in this experiment only carries such goal-related 
information on Rounds 2 and 3, and likewise, the caudate is only active during these rounds.   
Importantly, only two response options were present on each trial of this experiment, 
which meant that the amount of information provided by feedback on Round 1 was equated.  
Each type of feedback was equally useful in enabling participants to reach the goal of task 
mastery.  It is possible that if the two types of feedback were differentially effective in 
facilitating goal achievement, feedback could elicit caudate activation even during an initial 
round of trials.   This possibility is addressed in Experiment 2.  
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3.0  EXPERIMENT 2:  THE EFFECT OF THE INFORMATIONAL VALUE OF 
FEEDBACK ON CAUDATE ACTIVATION 
Previous work indicates that the caudate is involved in processing reward-related 
information, but that its activity is very context-dependent (e.g., Delgado et al., 2005a; Delgado 
et al., 2004; Hikosaka et al., 1989; Kawagoe et al., 1998).  In some cases, the same outcome can 
produce differing amounts of caudate activity, depending on how the outcome is interpreted.  For 
example, when monetary wins and losses were thought to be contingent upon a response, the 
caudate showed much stronger activation than when the outcomes were thought to be 
independent of a response, even though in both cases the outcomes were actually fixed (Tricomi 
et al., 2004).  In an interactive game, monetary wins and losses that resulted from decisions made 
by a partner of neutral moral character produced a differential response in the caudate nucleus, 
whereas identical outcomes thought to be from decisions made by a partner with praiseworthy 
moral character did not (Delgado et al., 2005a).  Another study found that earning no money 
when the alternative was losing money produced a greater response in the caudate than it did 
when the alternative was winning money (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005).  Importantly, this study 
demonstrates that the absolute value of the outcome is less important for driving caudate 
activation than the outcome’s value relative to other possible outcomes.   
Experiment 1 indicated that when positive and negative feedback provide equal amounts 
of information and do not indicate task success, little activation is observed in the caudate 
nucleus.  It did not address, however, whether the caudate would become active if positive and 
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negative feedback provided differing amounts of information.  In this context, positive and 
negative feedback would have different values relative to one another, which could drive caudate 
activation.  In Experiment 2, the same paired-associate word-learning task that was used in 
Experiment 1 was used again, except that the amount of information provided by the feedback 
was manipulated by altering the number of response options.     
In this task, participants choose which of several word options correctly forms a pair with 
the target word.  With only two response options, positive and negative feedback provide equal 
amounts of information about the correct answer; if the feedback is positive, the response chosen 
is correct, while if the feedback is negative, the response not chosen is correct.  However, with 
more than two response options, positive feedback provides more information about the correct 
answer than negative feedback, because the correct answer cannot be deduced from negative 
feedback.  Therefore, with more than two response options, positive feedback may be valued 
more highly than negative feedback, because it better helps the learner reach the goal of learning 
the correct pairs.  Consequently, in this context, positive feedback may serve as a reward, and 
negative feedback as a punishment, which may produce caudate activation.   
In addition, positive feedback would be less expected with more than two response 
options, and dopamine neurons in the midbrain, which project to the striatum, have been found to 
fire in proportion to how expected a reward is.  Unexpected rewards produce the most firing, 
while firing in anticipation of an upcoming reward increases as rewards become more expected 
(Fiorillo et al., 2003).  In fact, one can think of information as the deviation of an outcome from 
expectation; when an outcome is fully predicted, it provides no information, whereas if there is a 
low probability that any given action is the correct one, then positive feedback provides a large 
amount of information.  If caudate activity were to track with information in this way, and each 
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response option has an equal probability of being correct, then receipt of positive feedback 
should produce more caudate activation with more response choices than with fewer.  However, 
according to this account, negative feedback should produce more caudate activation with two 
choices than with more than two, since it is more expected with more possible options.  Such a 
finding would deviate from the results obtained in Experiment 1, in which purely informational 
feedback did not produce significant caudate activation for either positive or negative feedback 
when there were two response options. 
To examine how the informational value of feedback affects caudate activation, 
participants were scanned while performing the feedback-based word-learning task used in 
Experiment 1 with trials that had two or four response options.  A single round of trials were 
scanned, and the correct responses followed the laws of probability, such that there was a 50% 
chance of choosing the correct answer with two response options and a 25% chance of choosing 
the correct answer with four response options.  This allowed the amount of information carried 
by the feedback to be cleanly defined.  Post-tests were used to assess memory and confidence 
immediately following the scan and after one week. 
3.1 METHODS 
3.1.1 Participants 
Nineteen volunteers were recruited through posted advertisements and were paid $60 for 
their participation in the study.  Data from two participants were excluded due to a program error 
and data from a third participant were excluded due to excessive head motion, leaving 16 
participants in the analysis (11 women, 5 men; mean age ± SD, 22.9 ± 1.9).  All participants 
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were healthy, right-handed adults. No one who participated in Experiment 1 was allowed to 
participate in Experiment 2.  All participants signed an informed consent form according to the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of Pittsburgh.    
3.1.2 Materials 
As in Experiment 1, a 3 Tesla Siemens head-only scanner and standard radio frequency 
coil was used for all the MR scanning sessions. Stimulus presentation and behavioral data 
acquisition was controlled using “E-prime” software (Schneider et al., 2002) and the integrated 





Structural images were collected using a standard T1-weighted pulse sequence, in 42 
contiguous slices (3.125 x 3.125 x 3.0 mm voxels) parallel to the AC-PC line.  Thirty-eight 
functional images were collected in the locations of the middle 38 structural slices.  They were 
acquired using a one-shot echo-planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence [TR=2000 ms, TE=25 ms, 
FOV=20 cm, flip angle = 79°]. 
 
Behavioral paradigm: 
Experiment 2 involved a paired associate word learning task, similar to the one used in 
Experiment 1, except that varying numbers of response options were presented and only the 
initial encoding round was scanned.  Specifically, there were 60 trials with two options and 120 
trials with four options.  The experiment was designed such that participants were correct on 
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50% of trials with two options and 25% of trials with four options.  This trial structure ensured 
that there were at least 30 “correct” trials for each trial type, while maintaining chance levels of 
performance.   
The scan session consisted of 10 6-minute runs.  Each trial was 20 s long.  The same 
word lists used in Experiment 1 were used again, along with additional words subject to the same 
constraints (more words were needed for Experiment 2 than Experiment 1).  The words used in 
the different conditions were matched on all parameters (e.g., word length, number of syllables, 
etc.).  The procedure for each trial was the same as in Experiment 1, except that subjects were 
given 6 s to respond; this was necessary to allow enough time to read all four response options 
when present.  Trials with two and four response options were randomly intermixed.  Again the 
subjects were told to use the feedback to learn the correct word pairs.      
Following the scan, participants took a post-test, using the E-Prime program.  Instead of 
the multiple-choice format, the participants saw the target word and the word they picked on the 
corresponding trial during the scan, and were asked to respond as to whether the pairing was 
correct or incorrect.  This procedure was used so that for all trial conditions, there were two 
possible responses allowing performance between conditions to be compared.  No feedback was 
given.  Pairs from all 180 trials were presented, in random order.  As in Experiment 1, the post-
test was self-paced, and participants made confidence judgments following each trial by 
choosing a number from 1-7 (1 = complete guess, 7 = completely sure). Participants returned to 
the lab and completed the post-test a second time approximately one week later (4-8 days 
following the scan session, with 14 of 16 participants returning after 7 days).   
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3.1.3 Data Analysis 
Behavioral Data 
 Since accuracy during the scan is predetermined, the only useful behavioral data from the 
scanning session itself is the reaction time data.  A two-tailed t-test was performed to see if there 
were reaction time differences between trial types.  The behavioral data for the post-test were 
analyzed in terms of accuracy, reaction time, and confidence measures.  D-prime scores were 
calculated for each subject for each trial condition.  Two-tailed t-tests were used to determine 
whether performance exceeded chance for each trial type, and to determine whether performance 
differed between the trial types.  Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed to see whether 
reaction time and/or confidence differed across conditions.  Finally, a mixed model linear 
regression analysis of reaction time on confidence, with subject as a random factor, was 
performed for each post-test to determine whether differences in confidence judgments were 
associated with differences in reaction time. 
 
FMRI Data 
As in Experiment 1, the NeuroImaging Software package (NIS 3.5) was used to analyze 
the fMRI data.  Images were reconstructed and corrected for subject motion with Automated 
Image Registration (AIR 3.08; Woods et al., 1992).  Runs with head motion that exceeded 4 mm 
or degrees in any direction were not used in the analysis.  The images were detrended to adjust 
for scanner drift within runs.  The structural images of each subject were stripped to remove the 
skull and co-registered to a common reference brain (chosen from among the participants; 
(Woods et al., 1993).  Functional images were transformed into the same common space, 
normalized by a mean scaling of each image to match global mean image intensity across 
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subjects, and smoothed using a three-dimensional Gaussian filter (8 mm FWHM) to account for 
anatomical differences between subjects.  This set of data was then analyzed statistically. 
A voxel-wise analysis was performed on the fMRI data, through a repeated-measures 
three-way ANOVA with subject as a random factor and trial type (number of response options), 
accuracy (correct vs. incorrect), and time period (2 s time periods T1-T10) as within-subject 
factors.  Regions of interest (ROIs) were defined as regions with four or more contiguous voxels 
showing a significant effect.  Additional follow-up statistical contrasts were performed on the 
data from each trial type individually. 
A subsequent memory analysis was performed to investigate whether levels of activation 
during the scanning session predict accuracy on the post-test (Wagner et al., 1999).  As in 
previous work (Wagner et al., 1998), trials for which the correct answer was remembered with 
high confidence on the post-test following the scanning session were compared to trials 
corresponding to subsequent incorrect responses.  Trials were coded as “high confidence” if the 
confidence score was greater than or equal to 5 on the 7 point scale.  A voxel-wise repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed on the fMRI data with subject as a random factor and post-
test accuracy (high confidence correct vs. incorrect), and time (2 s time periods T1-T10) as 
within-subject factors.  Additionally, since there was an a priori hypothesis that the caudate 
might show a subsequent memory effect, the fMRI data in this region were analyzed with respect 




3.2.1 Behavioral Results 
Scanning session 
Behavioral data analyses were performed on the data from the participants that were 
included in the fMRI analysis.  During the scanning session, the average reaction time was 2409 
± 552 ms for the 2-choice condition and 3002 ± 852 ms for the 4-choice condition.  The 
difference between the two conditions was significant (t(15) = -5.7, p < 0.05, two-tailed), which 
is to be expected since it takes longer to read through four response options than two.    
 
Immediate Post-test 
The behavioral data for the post-tests were analyzed in terms of accuracy, reaction time, 
and confidence measures.  For the immediate post-test, the average d-prime score was 0.81 ± 0.7 
for the 2-choice condition and 0.91 ± 0.85 for the 4-choice condition.  This performance was 
better than chance for both conditions (t(15) = 4.9, p < 0.05 for the 2-choice condition; t(15) = 
4.3, p < 0.05 for the 4-choice condition), indicating that learning occurred.  The difference in 
performance between the conditions was not significant (t(15 = -0.64, p > 0.05).   
The average reaction time on the immediate post-test was 3125 ± 742 ms (mean ± SD).  
The post-test reaction time data was coded with respect to the feedback the subject received on 
the corresponding trial during the scan (feedback type), the trial type of the corresponding trial (2 
choices vs. 4 choices), and the post-test accuracy (correct vs. incorrect).  As shown in Figure 
10a, participants responded more quickly on accurate trials and on trials for which they had 
received positive feedback during the scan.  A repeated measures three-way ANOVA indicated 
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that there were significant main effects of feedback type (F(1, 18) = 5.5, p < 0.05) and post-test 
accuracy (F(1, 15.8) = 7.9, p < 0.05), but no interactions.   
The average confidence judgment score (out of 7) on the immediate post-test was 4.5 ± 
1.0 (mean ± SD).  The factors that acted to decrease reaction time also tended to increase 
confidence.  A repeated measures three-way ANOVA indicated that there was a main effect of 
feedback type (F(1, 16.4) = 29.4, p < 0.05), a main effect of post-test accuracy (F(1, 15.5) = 31.6, 
p < 0.05), and a trial type X feedback type X post-test accuracy interaction (F(1, 17.5) = 4.8, p < 
0.05).  As shown in Figure 10b, confidence was higher for accurate trials and for trials on which 
the participants had received positive feedback during the scan.  For the 4-choice condition, the 
effect of feedback type was present only for accurate trials.  Finally, increases in confidence 
judgments were associated with decreases in reaction time; a mixed model linear regression 
analysis of reaction time on confidence, with subject as a random factor, showed this effect to be 
significant (F(6, 2790) = 10.0, p < 0.05).    
Follow-up Post-test 
For the follow-up post-test one week after the scanning session, the average d-prime 
score was 0.35 ± 0.44 for the 2-choice condition and 0.39 ± 0.49 for the 4-choice condition.  This 
performance was better than chance for both conditions (t(15) = 3.2, p < 0.05 for the 2-choice 
condition; t(15) = 3.1, p < 0.05 for the 4-choice condition).  The difference in performance 
between the conditions was not significant (t(15) = -0.37, p > 0.05).   
The average reaction time on the follow-up post-test was 2495 ± 955 ms (mean ± SD).  
The effects observed on the immediate post-test are no longer observed on the follow-up post-
test.  A repeated measures three-way ANOVA indicated that there were no significant main 
effects, although there were significant interactions of trial type X feedback type (F(1, 19.5) = 
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5.1, p < 0.05), post-test accuracy X feedback type (F(1, 15.7) = 6.1, p < 0.05), and trial type X 
feedback type X post-test accuracy (F(1, 15.9) = 5.8, p < 0.05).  For the 4-choice condition, 
reaction time did not differ based on feedback type, but was faster correct than incorrect trials.  
For the 2-choice condition, reaction time was fastest for incorrect trials for which participants 
received positive feedback during the scan, slowest for incorrect trials for which they received 
negative feedback, and in between for correct trials (Figure 11a).  Since these effects no longer 
mirror the results found for the confidence judgments, they are difficult to interpret and may be 
the result of participants guessing very quickly on some trials and trying harder on others.  
The average confidence judgment score on the follow-up post-test was 3.5 ± 1.3 (mean ± 
SD).  A repeated measures three-way ANOVA indicated that there was a main effect of feedback 
type (F(1, 15.3) = 8.5, p < 0.05), a main effect of post-test accuracy (F(1, 15.3) = 14.9, p < 0.05), 
and a trial type X feedback type interaction (F(1, 15.7) = 8.6, p < 0.05).  This pattern is 
remarkably similar to that observed for the immediate post-test.  Confidence was higher for 
accurate trials on which the participants had received positive feedback during the scan, and this 
effect was greater for the 4-choice condition (Figure 11b). Finally, increases in confidence 
judgments were associated with decreases in reaction time; a mixed model linear regression 
analysis of reaction time on confidence, with subject as a random factor, showed this effect to be 
significant (F(6, 2670) = 15.2, p < 0.05).    
3.2.2 fMRI Results 
A voxel-wise ANOVA with subject as a random factor and trial type (2-choice vs. 4-
choice), feedback (positive vs. negative), and time period (2 s time periods T1-T10) as within-
subject factors was performed on the fMRI data.  The resulting activation clusters showing a 
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Trial Type by Time effect, at a threshold of p < 0.001 and a contiguity threshold of four voxels 
(cf. Tricomi et al., 2006), are listed in Table 7 and shown in Figure 12.  The most salient aspect 
of these results is that there is far greater activation in visual cortex for the 4-choice condition 
compared to the 2-choice condition; this makes sense given that there were two more words to 
process in the 4-choice condition.  The caudate is noticeably absent from the list of regions 
identified as significant for this contrast.     
 The regions displaying a significant effect of Feedback Type by Time are listed in Table 
8 and shown in Figure 13.  Although a number of regions were identified, the montage of the 
activated regions shows that compared to the Trial Type by Time contrast, the effect of Feedback 
Type by Time was relatively weak.  Again, the caudate was not identified as showing a 
significant effect for this contrast.    
Figure 14 depicts the activation clusters that were identified as showing a three-way Trial 
Type by Feedback Type by Time interaction at a significance level of p < 0.001 and a cluster 
threshold of four voxels.  The corresponding areas are listed in Table 9.  The most common 
pattern of activation among these regions was for them to show greater activation following 
positive feedback than negative feedback for the 4-choice condition, with this effect either absent 
or smaller in the 2-choice condition.  One such region was identified in the dorsal portion of the 
head of the right caudate nucleus.  The time courses of activation are plotted in Figure 15.  
Contrary to the findings from Experiment 1, trials in both the 2-choice condition and the 4-
choice condition elicited a hemodynamic response in the caudate.  Only the 4-choice condition, 
however, differentiates between positive and negative feedback.  Since previous work has found 
such differentiation 6-9 s following a feedback display (e.g., Tricomi et al., 2006), two-tailed t-
tests were performed on the data from the corresponding time points in this experiment, T7 and 
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T8.  No significant differences were found for the 2-choice condition, while a significant 
difference was found at T8 for the 4-choice condition (t(15) = 3.3, p < 0.05).  Despite this 
differentiation, the hemodynamic response did not decrease below baseline in the way that is 
typical of “punishment” responses (e.g., Delgado et al., 2000; Tricomi et al., 2004).   
The largest cluster and the one with the highest peak F-value that was identified as 
showing the three-way interaction was in the left prefrontal cortex (PFC), including activated 
voxels in both the dorsolateral PFC and the inferior frontal gyrus, as well as the insula.  The 
significance threshold was increased until this region separated into regions of smaller than 100 
voxels; the pattern of activation was the same, so the average time course over the entire 
activated region has been plotted in Figure 16.  As in the caudate, there is no differentiation 
between trials with positive and negative feedback for the 2-choice condition, while there is a 
greater response to positive feedback than negative feedback for the 4-choice condition.  
Additionally, the signal following positive feedback in the 4-choice condition exceeded the 
signal for the 2-choice condition.     
 To confirm the results of the three-way interaction and to more closely investigate striatal 
areas that might be showing differential responses to positive and negative feedback in the two 
conditions, follow-up ANOVAs were performed on the data from the 4-choice condition and the 
2-choice condition individually.  The resulting activation clusters showing a Feedback by Time 
effect, at a threshold of p < 0.001 and a cluster threshold of 4 voxels, are listed in Tables 10 and 
11 and displayed in Figures 17 and 18.  A large region in the left DLPFC, IFG, and insula was 
found to show a significant effect for the 4-choice condition, with a greater response to positive 
than negative feedback; no such region was identified in the 2-choice condition, which is 
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consistent with the finding that this region shows a three-way interaction of trial type, feedback 
type, and time.   
Significant clusters were identified in both the left and right caudate nuclei for the 4-
choice condition, but not for the 2-choice condition.  The location of these clusters was in the 
ventral head of the caudate, which more closely replicates the location identified in previous 
work than the more dorsal region identified as showing the three-way interaction in the 
preceding analysis (cf. Delgado et al., 2000; Tricomi et al., 2006).  The time courses, too, show a 
response profile that is somewhat more similar to that shown in previous work, with a more 
defined response peak than the more dorsal region (Figure 19).  Still, both regions show the same 
basic pattern of activation; although a response is elicited in both conditions, it only 
differentiates between positive and negative feedback in the 4-choice condition.  Again, the 
difference in activation between conditions was compared at time points T7 and T8 with two-
tailed t-tests; the differentiation was not significant for the 2-choice condition and was significant 
for the 4-choice condition at T8 for the left caudate (t(15) = 2.3, p < 0.05) and at T7 and T8 for 
the right caudate (t(15) = 2.4 for both time points, p < 0.05).  It should be noted, however, that 
this differentiation appears to begin earlier than this time frame, and is apparent in the time 
course graphs at T6, which is the time point of peak activation.  This, in addition to the fact that 
the response does not dip below baseline for negative feedback trials, may indicate that the 
negative feedback response is not analogous to the punishment responses observed in previous 
work (e.g., Delgado et al., 2000). 
As in Experiment 1, the hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus displayed a strong main 
effect of time (peak Talairach coordinates: -28, -15, -15 and 24, -18, -12 for left and right sides, 
respectively). The threshold was increased to isolate the hippocampal activation clusters from 
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contiguous activated regions, and is shown in Figure 20, along with the time courses of 
activation.  The locations and pattern of activation are consistent with the results from 
Experiment 1, with the signal decreasing from trial onset, and recovering following the feedback 
display.   
Table 12 lists the regions that showed a post-test accuracy by time effect on the 
immediate post-test.  These regions are also displayed in Figure 21.  Most of these areas showed 
greater activation when the trial would be remembered with high confidence on the post-test 
following the scanning session than when performance would be inaccurate, although there were 
two small regions showing the opposite effect.  Among the regions displaying a subsequent 
memory effect were the left and right inferior frontal gyri, left hippocampus/parahippocampus, 
and left fusiform, which are regions that have previously been associated with subsequent 
memory (Brewer et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1999).  A similar analysis performed on the data 
coded by accuracy on the 1-week follow-up post-test revealed five regions showing a post-test 
accuracy by time effect (p < 0.001).  These regions were the right parahippocampal gyrus (peak 
Talairach coordinates: 27, -21, -9), two small regions in the left middle temporal gyrus (-51, -48, 
9 and -51, -69, 15), and left inferior parietal lobule (-65, -45, 30).  Of these, only the cluster in 
the right parahippocampal gyrus displayed a clear subsequent memory effect with greater 
activation for trials that would be remembered with high confidence than subsequently incorrect 
trials.   It is interesting that the region in the right parahippocampal gyrus was not identified as 
showing a subsequent memory effect for the immediate post-test, but did show such an effect for 
the follow-up post-test.  This indicates that the role of this region in the formation of enduring 
memories was masked during the first post-test, when a greater proportion of answers were 
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remembered with high confidence; in other words, the activity in this region was only elevated 
for trials that would still be remembered with high confidence after a week’s delay. 
Since there was an a priori hypothesis that the caudate might show a subsequent memory 
effect, the post-test accuracy data (for trials from both the 2-choice and 4-choice conditions) 
were applied to the caudate activation clusters that displayed a significant feedback type by time 
effect for the 4-choice condition.  For trials on which participants received positive feedback 
during the scanning session, caudate activation was greater when subsequent performance on the 
post-test would be accurate than when it would be inaccurate (Figure 22).  In the left caudate, 
this effect was significant at timepoints T6 and T7 (i.e., 4-8 s after the onset of the feedback 
display; t(15) = 2.7 for T6, t(15) = 2.2 for T7, p < 0.05, two-tailed).  The effect was not 
significant in the right caudate, nor were there any significant differences for trials on which 
negative feedback was presented during the scan (Figure 22). 
3.3 DISCUSSION 
In this experiment, the caudate responded to both positive and negative feedback during 
the first presentation of trials of a multiple-choice task involving learning arbitrary word pairs.  
This finding stands in contrast to the findings from the first round of trials in Experiment 1, in 
which the caudate did not show a rise in activation during the same task with only two response 
options.  In fact, the response to positive feedback was actually more sustained than for Round 2 
of Experiment 1; the signal does not return back to baseline until the last time point of the trial 
(12-14 s after the onset of the feedback display), compared to a return to baseline 4-6 s after the 
feedback presentation in Experiment 1.  The presence of this signal in the caudate can be 
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explained in terms of the difference that feedback is playing in goal-directed behavior in the two 
experiments.  In the first round of Experiment 1, positive and negative feedback helped learners 
reach their goal of learning the correct answers equally well.  In contrast, in this experiment, 
positive feedback indicated which answer was correct, but in the 4-choice condition, negative 
feedback did not.  Therefore, positive feedback may have been perceived as more rewarding than 
negative feedback when there were four choices.  Potentially because of this, caudate activation 
was produced, which differentiated between the two feedback types in the 4-choice condition. 
Despite this differentiation, it is interesting to note that the pattern of the response to 
negative feedback is unlike that observed in Experiment 1, and unlike the “punishment” response 
observed in previous work (e.g., Delgado et al., 2000).  Specifically, although the signal 
following positive feedback is greater than following negative feedback, the negative feedback 
signal does not dip below baseline.  In fact, it remains sustained above baseline, looking more 
like a “reward” response, than a “punishment” response, albeit a smaller one than for the positive 
feedback condition.  Previous work has found the peak of the punishment response to be at least 
as great as that for the reward response, with the differentiation occurring later in the time 
course.  In contrast, in this case, the peak response for positive feedback is greater than the peak 
for negative feedback.  It is possible, then, that negative feedback was not interpreted as a 
punishment in this experiment, but rather as less of a reward compared to positive feedback. 
As discussed with respect to Experiment 1, a sense of agency in determining the outcome 
of one’s actions has been linked to an increase in caudate activation (Tricomi et al., 2004).  Yet 
in this experiment, the sense of agency is minimal; as in the first round of Experiment 1, 
participants know that their responses are arbitrarily related to the feedback they receive, and that 
there is no way of knowing in advance which response is most likely to be correct.  Although 
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this minimal contingency between action and outcome was sufficient to allow caudate activation 
in this experiment, the lack of real agency in determining the outcome may help explain why the 
caudate’s response to negative feedback was uncharacteristic of a punishment response.  
Although negative feedback may have been the less desirable outcome, participants knew it was 
unavoidable, so it may not have acted as a true punishment in the way that negative feedback did 
on Rounds 2 and 3 of Experiment 1, when negative feedback was a direct indication of a failure 
of the learner to remember the correct answer.     
The caudate did not differentiate between positive and negative feedback in the 2-choice 
condition.  Each carried the same amount of information, and may have been interpreted as 
equally rewarding.  What is more surprising is that the caudate responded at all in this condition, 
given the results from Experiment 1, in which the caudate showed no response for the same task 
with two choices.  It seems that by simply intermixing trials with two response options with trials 
with 4, the interpretation of the feedback was different enough to produce activation in the 
caudate.  Rather than viewing the 2-choice condition and 4-choice condition as fundamentally 
different, it seems that feedback in these two conditions was interpreted, by the caudate at least, 
to be part of a single set.  Yet positive and negative feedback weren’t interpreted categorically 
across the two conditions; negative feedback produced a greater response in the 2-choice 
condition than the 4-choice condition.  It seems that the experimental paradigm was interpreted 
as a single task with four possible outcomes.  Of these, negative feedback in the 4-choice 
condition was the only one which did not provide enough information to determine the correct 
word pair, and the response of the caudate in this situation was distinct from the response to the 
other three possible outcomes.  It would be interesting to see how far the extent of this influence 
of the 4-choice condition on the caudate’s activity in the 2-choice condition would go.  If the 
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trials were blocked, rather than randomly intermixed, would there still be caudate activation for 
the 2-choice condition?  What if all of the 4-choice trials were presented first, followed by the 2-
choice trials?  These questions remain open, and would further fine-tune our understanding of 
the influences of context on the caudate’s activity. 
 In the 2-choice condition of this experiment, there is a 50% chance of receiving negative 
feedback and a 50% chance of receiving positive feedback; thus the two feedback types are 
equally expected.  In the 4-choice condition, there is a 25% chance of receiving positive 
feedback and a 75% chance of receiving negative feedback.  Therefore, overall, positive and 
negative feedback in the 2-choice condition are each more expected than positive feedback in the 
4-choice condition and less expected than negative feedback in the 4-choice condition.  Thus, if 
the caudate were coding specifically for the informational value of the feedback, defined as the 
degree to which the outcome deviates from expectation, then its response should be greatest in 
response to positive feedback in the 4-choice condition and least in response to negative 
feedback in the 4-choice condition, with a response to both negative and positive feedback in the 
2-choice condition in between.  This is not quite the pattern observed in the caudate.  Rather, the 
response to all conditions other than negative feedback in the 4-choice condition is about the 
same, with that condition showing a smaller response.  Instead of tracking with the informational 
value of the feedback, defined in this way, the caudate’s outcome response seems to be tracking 
with the probability of knowing the correct answer on the next presentation of the identical trial, 
given perfect memory.  Other brain regions, however, do show a pattern in which the positive 
feedback response is even greater in the 4-choice condition than the 2-choice condition, and are 
discussed in the General Discussion chapter of this thesis.  
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 In this experiment, when positive feedback was delivered, the caudate was more active 
for trials that would subsequently be remembered than for trials that would subsequently be 
forgotten.  This suggests that caudate activation may indeed facilitate feedback-based learning.  
There were, however, no such differences for trials in which negative feedback was delivered.  
Interestingly, positive feedback led to higher confidence ratings on the post-tests than negative 
feedback, which is consistent with the conclusion that the caudate strengthened associations 
based on positive feedback more than negative feedback.  It could be that the caudate only 
facilitates appetitive learning, or these results could be due to the fact that the response to 
negative feedback was not truly an “error” response.  
Either way, the caudate is not acting in isolation in its involvement in feedback-based 
learning.  Once again, the hippocampus/parahippocampus showed a strong main effect of time, 
indicating that responses can be elicited in the MTL and striatum simultaneously.  As in 
Experiment 1 and previous work, activation in regions such as the left inferior frontal gyrus, left 
medial temporal lobe, and left fusiform gyrus were found to predict which trials would 
subsequently be remembered on the post-test following the scanning session.  Interestingly, the 
right parahippocampal gyrus showed a subsequent memory effect with relation to the post-test 
occurring one week after the scanning session, but not the post-test occurring immediately after 
it.  This is consistent with the results of Wittman, et al. (2005), who found that reward-associated 
cues led to activation of the midbrain and striatum and improved memory performance, but this 
effect was also only apparent after a long delay.  The same effect did not hold for “intermediate-
term memory,” or in other words, of memory that occurs after the period of active maintenance 
of working memory, but which is still in a labile state (Eichenbaum, 2002).  During this time, it 
is expected that the memory should be dependent on the MTL but not yet consolidated 
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(McClelland et al., 1995).  Wittman, et al. (2005) argue that the reward-related activation helped 
to determine which memories the MTL would successfully consolidate into long-term memory 
and which would instead decay.  Likewise, even low levels of activation in the MTL might have 
been enough to support intermediate-term memory in the present experiment, whereas only 
memories associated with higher BOLD signal during encoding were resistant to decay and were 
successfully consolidated into long-term memory.  
In summary, the results of this experiment build upon the results of Experiment 1 by 
demonstrating the strong role that context plays in guiding feedback-related caudate activation.  
By simply including a condition with four response options as well as two, the caudate was 
engaged in all conditions, whereas this was not the case when only two response options were 
present in Experiment 1.  The critical feature present in Experiment 2 was that positive and 
negative feedback carried different amounts of information, and thereby were perceived to aid 
learners in reaching their goal of task mastery to different degrees.  In the general discussion that 
follows, a more thorough discussion of the factors influencing feedback-related caudate activity 
is presented. 
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4.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this discussion, I will integrate the results from the two experiments presented in this 
thesis in order to draw conclusions about the nature of feedback-related caudate activation, as 
well as the role that other regions may play in feedback-based learning.  In addition, I will 
discuss potential interactions between the reward system and the declarative memory system. 
4.1 THE NATURE OF FEEDBACK-RELATED CAUDATE ACTIVATION 
The signal produced in the caudate nucleus during feedback-based learning appears to 
reflect both activity occurring prior to the feedback display (as indicated by the initial rise of the 
response) and activity that results from processing the feedback itself.  This latter component of 
the signal seems to reflect feedback valence, because depending on the outcome, the signal will 
follow one of two general trajectories.  The “reward” response is characterized by a sustained 
signal following an outcome of positive value, whereas the “punishment” response is 
characterized by a sharp decrease in signal following a negative outcome.  Factors that affect the 
initial rise, the “reward” response, and the “punishment” response will each be considered in 
turn. 
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4.1.1 The Rise 
Unlike the activity of midbrain dopaminergic neurons (Fiorillo et al., 2003), the 
magnitude of caudate activation prior to outcome delivery does not appear to be proportional to 
either the probability of an upcoming reward or the uncertainty about the valence of the 
upcoming outcome.  If it were proportional to the probability of an upcoming reward, then the 
signal in the caudate nuclei would have had to have been greater for the 2-choice condition in 
Experiment 2 (for which the probability of positive feedback was 50%) than the 4-choice 
condition (for which the probability of positive feedback was 25%).  However, the magnitude of 
the caudate signal rise did not differ between these two conditions.  Additionally, for Experiment 
1, the probability of positive feedback is highest during Round 3, when the most learning has 
occurred, but the magnitude of the signal rise is actually attenuated for this round compared to 
the signal during Round 2.  If the signal rise were proportional to the uncertainty about whether 
the outcome would be positive or negative, then it would have been greatest during Round 1 of 
Experiment 1 (in which the probability of positive feedback is 50%, and therefore uncertainty is 
maximal), yet during this round the signal was actually weakest.  Likewise, uncertainty was 
maximal for the 2-choice condition of Experiment 2, yet the magnitude of the signal rise did not 
differ between the 2-choice and 4-choice conditions. 
The magnitude of the initial rise in caudate signal prior to the presentation of the 
feedback display instead seems to reflect the degree to which the individual “cares” about the 
valence of the impending outcome.  Two factors seem to be critical in determining this 
parameter.  First, we know from a previous study that rewards and punishments in and of 
themselves are not enough to trigger caudate activation; instead, they must be perceived as the 
consequence of an action (Tricomi et al., 2004).  In that study, an arbitrary linking of responses 
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and outcomes was enough for caudate activation to be elicited; it was only when outcomes were 
perceived to have no relation at all to responses that caudate activity was diminished.  This 
minimal sense of agency in determining the outcome was present even on the first presentation 
of each trial in the experiments presented here.  The fact that caudate activation was elicited in 
Experiment 2 again shows that only an arbitrary relationship between action and outcome is 
necessary for caudate activation to be elicited.  On the other hand, that a robust signal in the head 
of the caudate was not present during Round 1 of Experiment 1 shows that this minimal sense of 
agency is not sufficient to drive feedback-related caudate activation in this region.   Still, this 
does not rule out the possibility than an increased sense of agency on Rounds 2 and 3 resulted in 
increased caudate activation; it merely suggests that a sense of agency is not the sole factor in 
modulating the magnitude of the caudate signal rise. 
The experiments presented here indicate that a second factor is also critical to the 
activation of the caudate nuclei: the potential outcomes of the action must differ in their value to 
the individual.  In the case of Round 1 of Experiment 1, the task cannot be learned without 
paying attention to whether the feedback is positive or negative, and significant learning does 
occur.  In this sense, the learners do care about the feedback.  Yet apparently information that 
can lead to task success is not enough to activate the caudate if it is equivalent on every trial; 
rather than treating both positive and negative feedback as rewarding, the caudate was not 
strongly engaged.  Both positive and negative feedback provided equal amounts of information 
about which answer was the correct one, and so both were equally valuable in helping learners 
achieve their goal of learning the correct answers.  Because of this, learners may not have been 
invested in which type of feedback they received; they may not have felt that their response 
choice “mattered,” and so they may not have cared about the valence of the outcome of their 
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response.  It would be interesting to observe the response in the caudate if trials like these were 
intermixed with trials in which no feedback was provided.  In this case, both positive and 
negative feedback might act as a “reward,” since both provide useful information, while an 
outcome of no feedback might act as “punishment.”  In anticipation of these differential 
outcomes, there might be a rise in caudate activation. 
On Rounds 2 and 3 of Experiment 1, positive and negative feedback took on a different 
meaning from its meaning on Round 1.  It provided a new type of information—information 
about whether learners were achieving their goal of learning the correct word pairs.  This 
information differed in its potential reward value; positive feedback indicated task success, while 
negative feedback indicated an error in performance.  As such, participants were highly invested 
in the outcome valence, and correspondingly, a signal was produced in the caudate nuclei. 
In Experiment 2, positive and negative feedback had different relative values in the 4-
choice condition, since positive feedback better helped the learner achieve the goal of learning 
the correct word pairs.  This was enough to produce a rise in caudate signal prior to the outcome 
display.  Interestingly, this effect generalized to the 2-choice condition as well.  This leads to the 
question of whether expectation-based caudate activity changes on a trial-by-trial basis, or 
whether it always generalizes across trials.  There is some evidence that the caudate is able to 
modulate this activity at the trial level.  When trials involving monetary rewards and 
punishments thought to be contingent upon a button press were randomly intermixed with trials 
where no contingency was present, only the trials with perceived contingency elicited caudate 
activation (Tricomi et al., 2004).  In that experiment, however, participants may have viewed 
these conditions as two separate, though interspersed, tasks, whereas trials in the 2-choice and 4-
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choice conditions in Experiment 2 may have all been considered to be instances of the same task, 
leading to a generalization in expectancy-based activation. 
Over the course of learning, the signal in the caudate tends to decrease (Delgado et al., 
2005b; Haruno et al., 2004; Law et al., 2005; Pasupathy & Miller, 2005).  This can be explained 
in terms of the expected value of the feedback to the learner decreasing.  If the learner is already 
sure of the correct response, then positive feedback will not be useful, since it will not provide 
any new information.  In Experiment 1, this effect is exhibited on Round 3, which shows 
attenuation in signal rise compared to Round 2, and performance is also higher on Round 3.  
Furthermore, the initial rise in signal displayed during Round 2 of Experiment 1 appears to be 
weaker than the signal rise displayed in Experiment 2 (cf. Figures 5 and 19).  This may be due to 
the fact that learners were already performing well above chance on Round 2 of Experiment 1, so 
positive feedback may have already been more expected than negative feedback.  In contrast, 
overall there was a smaller chance of obtaining positive than negative feedback in Experiment 2.  
As mentioned above, this effect stands in contrast to findings from electrophysiological 
recordings from dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain in monkeys, which indicate that these 
neurons increase their firing prior to outcome delivery as a function of the probability of reward 
(Fiorillo et al., 2003).  A key difference between the experimental paradigms in these studies and 
the one used in the experiments presented here is that the cues that predict reward in the monkey 
studies are conditioned; that is, the animal learns over many presentations that the cue predicts 
the reward.  In contrast, in the experiments presented here, participants know from the outset that 
they will receive feedback at the end of each trial.  It may be that such top-down knowledge of 
the task structure does not affect midbrain neuron firing in the way that slowly conditioning a 
cue-outcome expectation does.   
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Some speculation is warranted on what purpose the initial rise in caudate activation 
serves.  Lauwereyns, et al. (Lauwereyns et al., 2002a; Lauwereyns et al., 2002b) suggest that 
anticipatory activation in the caudate may exert top-down control on stimulus processing, 
increasing the activity level in perceptual regions involved in the detecting the reward signal.  
Similarly, in the experimental paradigm used in the experiments presented here, the pre-outcome 
signal in the caudate may act to focus the individual’s attention on the rewarding or punishing 
aspects of the upcoming outcome.     
4.1.2 The “Reward” Response 
Following the presentation of an outcome of positive value, there tends to be a sustained 
response in the caudate nucleus.  This occurs if the outcome is better than the alternatives.  
However, this response does not occur if there was no rise in activity prior to the outcome 
display, indicating that it is dependent upon the same factors that produce that initial rise.  For 
example, there is no increase in signal prior to the feedback presentation during Round 1 of 
Experiment 1, and there is also no increase in signal following positive feedback.  Similarly, just 
as the initial rise exhibited in Round 2 of Experiment 1 was not as great as the rise for 
Experiment 2, the response to positive feedback is also less sustained than for Experiment 2 (cf. 
Figures 5 and 19).  This suggests that when a positive outcome is expected, it produces not only 
a small anticipatory response, but also a small outcome response.  Conversely, when an action 
has the potential to produce a positive outcome, but such an outcome is unlikely, there appears to 
be a larger anticipatory response and also a larger response following the outcome if it does turn 
out to be positive. 
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 In Experiment 2, the response following positive feedback was greater on trials 
associated with correct post-test performance than trials associated with incorrect post-test 
performance.  This suggests that this “reward” signal can serve to facilitate learning.  This is not 
to say that it is the only region involved in feedback-based learning, as there were a number of 
brain regions which showed subsequent memory effects.  Nor is the caudate necessary for 
feedback-based learning to occur; the fact that significant learning occurred during Round 1 of 
Experiment 1, when there was no activation in the caudate, indicates otherwise.  Regions outside 
of the brain’s reward system may perform such functions as using the feedback to determine 
which response option is correct and forming a memory of the correct answer, while the caudate 
may interact with these regions, potentially through the attentional system.  Perhaps the reward 
response in the caudate serves as a “priority signal,” leading to better processing of reward-
related information than neutral information.     
4.1.3 The “Punishment” Response 
The signal in the caudate nuclei tends to display a sharp decrease from the response peak 
following outcomes of negative value.  The more sharply negative the slope of this decrease, the 
stronger in magnitude this “punishment” response is.  Often, the signal decreases below baseline 
before returning to its resting state.  Unlike the reward signal, the magnitude of the punishment 
“dip” is not closely linked with the magnitude of the signal prior to feedback delivery.  This is 
seen in Experiment 1, in which there is even a small dip on Round 1, despite a flat response prior 
to outcome delivery.  There was also an especially large dip on Rounds 2 and 3, even though 
there was a relatively small anticipatory rise.  One reason for this pronounced dip may have been 
that when positive outcomes are expected, negative outcomes are unexpected, and just as 
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unexpected rewards result in a large reward response, so too may unexpected punishments result 
in punishment responses of greater magnitude.   
A second reason for the pronounced dip may have been the strong sense of agency in 
determining the outcome during Rounds 2 and 3 of the first experiment.  Negative feedback in 
that situation indicated that participants had made a true error, as opposed to an incorrect 
uneducated guess.  This stands in contrast to the situation in Experiment 2, when for the 4-chocie 
condition, the caudate signal following negative feedback did not rise to the same level as the 
reward response, but also showed an uncharacteristically sustained response for a “punishment” 
response.  In fact, this response looks rather similar to the response to positive feedback during 
Round 2 of Experiment 1 (cf. Figures 5 and 19).  Added to this is the fact that the response 
following negative feedback in the 2-choice condition of Experiment 2 did not differ at all from 
the response to positive feedback; both responses look like sustained “reward” responses.  
Therefore, it appears that negative feedback in this experiment was not interpreted as a 
punishment, but rather as a reward that varied in magnitude depending upon the amount of 
information it provided (i.e., small for the 4-choice condition and large for the 2-choice 
condition).  Presumably, if the brain were imaged during a second round of trials in Experiment 
2, the caudate’s response would look more like the responses displayed for Rounds 2 and 3 of 
Experiment 1.  For the two-choice condition especially, negative feedback would likely produce 
a “punishment” response rather than a “reward” response.  For trials in the 4-choice condition, 
however, negative feedback would not necessarily indicate an error, but might simply mean the 
learner made a second incorrect guess; therefore, the magnitude of the dip might be expected to 
be less strong than for the 2-choice condition. 
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What might be the purpose of the punishment signal?  One possibility is that it is a part of 
an error detection system.  Another possibility is that the punishment signal might act to keep the 
dorsolateral striatum from strengthening a stimulus-response bond.  One way it could do this is 
through its projections back to the midbrain.  The caudate projects to cells in the substantia nigra 
that are intermixed with cells that project to the dorsolateral striatum (Haber et al., 2000).  It is 
possible that the decrease in caudate activity could serve to decrease the firing of dopaminergic 
cells in the midbrain.  This might aid in preventing the reward system from strengthening S-R 
associations that lead to a negative outcome.  
4.2 FRONTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO FEEDBACK PROCESSING 
The pattern of activation shown in the caudate nuclei in the studies presented here 
suggests that they are subject to top-down control.  The activity levels reflect knowledge of such 
high level notions as what the meaning of the feedback is in relation to the task at hand.  As the 
input unit of the basal ganglia, the striatum receives a wide range of converging input from the 
cortex (Bar-Gad et al., 2003).  Several regions in the frontal cortex have been linked to reward 
processing and reward-related learning (Elliott et al., 2000a; Elliott et al., 2000b; Fellows & 
Farah, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; O'Doherty et al., 2001).  The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) is involved in executive function, such as working memory, and may be involved in 
reward-based learning tasks to the extent that they require such processes (Boettiger & 
D'Esposito, 2005; Fellows & Farah, 2005).  The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and 
orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to be especially important for reversal learning tasks in 
which stimulus-response-outcome contingencies are changed and participants must adjust their 
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responses accordingly (Fellows & Farah, 2005; O'Doherty et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2001; 
Rolls, 1999).  Finally, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been suggested to be involved in 
error detection or response conflict (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2004; van Veen et 
al., 2004).  The DLPFC, VMPFC, and ACC all project to the striatum (Haber et al., 2006), and 
they also receive input from the basal ganglia through basal ganglia-thalamocortical pathways 
(Middleton & Strick, 2002).  Thus, these regions are in a good position to interact with the 
striatum during feedback-based learning.  In this section, the patterns of activation displayed in 
these frontal regions in the experiments presented here will be discussed.  
4.2.1 Lateral Prefrontal Cortex 
An expansive region which included voxels in the dorsolateral and inferior frontal 
portions of the PFC, as well as the adjoining insula, showed an interaction of round, feedback 
type, and time in Experiment 1.  A similar region showed an interaction of trial type, feedback 
type and time in Experiment 2.  At first glance, the pattern of activation in this area across the 
two experiments appears contradictory.  During Rounds 2 and 3 of Experiment 1, the signal is 
greater following negative feedback than positive feedback, but for the 4-choice condition of 
Experiment 2, the signal is greater following positive feedback than negative feedback (cf. 
Figures 7 and 16).  How can this apparent discrepancy be explained?  This region does not seem 
to be coding for the valence of the outcome (i.e., whether it is positive or negative), but instead 
seems to reflect the amount of information provided by the feedback, regardless of its sign. 
As discussed previously, as learning progresses, positive feedback carries less and less 
information as the learner becomes sure of the correct answers, making positive feedback 
redundant.  Reflecting this, the signal following positive feedback decreases with increasing 
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round in Experiment 1, so that there is only a small response to positive feedback on Round 3 
(Fig. 7).  Conversely, negative feedback continues to provide information, since it indicates an 
error, and likewise, the signal following negative feedback remains high for all rounds.  For 
Experiment 2, positive feedback in 4-choice condition provides enough information to determine 
the correct answer, while negative feedback in the 4-choice condition only provides enough 
information to eliminate one of the four response options.  Again the left PFC reflects this 
pattern with a smaller response to negative feedback than positive feedback in this condition.  
For the 2-choice condition, in which both positive and negative feedback provide enough 
information to determine the correct answer, there is no such differentiation in the signal in the 
left PFC.  Furthermore, since positive feedback is less expected in the 4-choice condition than 
the 2-choice condition, it can be thought of as more informative in this instance since the 
outcome deviates more from the expected outcome.  Indeed, the signal in the left PFC fits with 
the explanation that it may reflect this informational value of feedback, since the response to 
positive feedback is greater in the 4-choice condition than the 2-choice condition.   
Such a pattern of activation does not necessarily mean that the specific role of the left 
PFC is to code for the amount of information provided by feedback.  Instead, it could simply 
reflect the increased processing demands that occur when more information is available.  For 
example, the dorsolateral PFC has been associated with a role in executive control processes, 
such as working memory, and it may be that with more information, there is an increased load on 
this system as it updates memory representations.  
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4.2.2 Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
The dorsal anterior cingulate and medial frontal gyrus have been suggested to be 
involved in detecting errors, either through self-detection or from negative feedback (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2004).  Others have argued that this region is not involved in error 
detection per se, but rather that it increases in activity as conflict between incompatible 
processing streams increases (Botvinick et al., 2001; van Veen et al., 2004).  In Experiment 1, a 
large activation cluster was identified spanning across voxels in the medial frontal gyrus, 
superior frontal gyrus, and dorsal anterior cingulate that showed greater activation to negative 
feedback than positive feedback, and a smaller cluster in the anterior cingulate displayed a round 
by accuracy by time interaction, with an increased difference in signal between trials with 
negative and positive feedback as the round increased.   This pattern of activation could be 
consistent with a role for this region in error detection.  However, in Experiment 2, a similar 
activation cluster in the medial frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus showed a three-way 
interaction of trial type, feedback type, and time, with a greater response to positive feedback 
than negative feedback in the 4-choice condition, but not the 2-choice condition.  This finding 
conflicts with an interpretation of a specific role of this region in error detection.  It is more 
consistent with the idea that this region may become more active with increasing conflict.  There 
is increased conflict when negative feedback indicates a true error, as in Rounds 2 and 3 of 
Experiment 1, than when it simply indicates an incorrect guess, as in Round 1.  Likewise, 
positive feedback may cause more conflict when it is less expected, as in the 4-choice condition, 
than when positive and negative feedback are equally expected.    
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4.2.3 Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex 
 The VMPFC is another region that has been implicated in processing negative feedback.  
Neuropsychology studies indicate that patients with VMPFC damage are impaired at trial-and-
error learning, and that this impairment is caused by a specific deficit in the ability to learn from 
punishment, while the ability to learn from reward remains intact (Fellows & Farah, 2005; 
Wheeler, 2006).  This idea would suggest that the VMPFC should show a difference in the signal 
following negative and positive feedback in the experimental paradigm utilized in the 
experiments presented here.  However, no such result was found.  Although this null finding 
should be interpreted with caution, due to the fact that this region is particularly prone to 
susceptibility artifact, a region in the VMPFC was identified as displaying a subsequent memory 
effect, with greater signal for trials that would be remembered with high confidence than trials 
for which performance would be incorrect.  This does suggest some role of the VMPFC in 
feedback-based learning.  It is consistent with the recent finding that in addition to reflecting 
knowledge of higher order task structure, the VMPFC displays an “update signal” that reflects 
the change in the probability that a certain choice will be correct (Hampton et al., 2006).  It may 
be that the VMPFC plays a role in learning from both positive and negative feedback, but that 
other regions can compensate and allow learning from positive reinforcement to proceed if the 
VMPFC is damaged, whereas there may not be similar compensatory mechanisms for learning 
from negative feedback. 
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4.3 LEARNING IN A FEEDBACK-BASED DECLARATIVE MEMORY TASK 
4.3.1 Medial Temporal Lobe Contributions 
Neuropsychological work demonstrates the crucial importance of the MTL in forming 
arbitrary associations, like those that were learned in the experiments presented here (Squire, 
2004; Zola & Squire, 2000).  Yet, this region showed a decreasing response profile in both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  Previous work has also found that MTL activation tends to be 
below baseline when that baseline is unconstrained (Stark & Squire, 2001).  These decreases can 
be avoided if a baseline task is utilized that disrupts MTL recruitment (Stark & Squire, 2001).  
However, this would seem to change the nature of the task, eliminating not only task-unrelated 
thought that might be associated with activity in the MTL, but also reducing the amount of time 
when the MTL can be recruited to aid in memory formation.  Despite the negative response 
profile, there is evidence that the MTL is playing a role in memory formation in the experiments 
presented here.  In addition to showing a main effect of time, the MTL displayed subsequent 
memory effects.  In particular, in Experiment 2, a region in the left hippocampus and 
parahippocampal gyrus showed greater activation for trials on the immediate post-test for which 
participants responded correctly with high confidence compared to incorrect trials.  Additionally, 
a similar effect was found for the delayed post-test in the right parahippocampal gyrus, and the 
location of the region showing this effect was quite close to the region identified as showing a 
main effect of time (peak coordinates: 27, -21, -9 and 24, -28, -12, respectively).  Therefore, 
although the MTL seems to display a high level of tonic activity, which then tends to decrease 
when attention is focused on a learning a simple arbitrary association, this relatively low level of 
activity appears to still support memory formation.  It should be noted that arbitrary word pairs 
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are much less rich in detail than the more complex associations that we make every day, and 
indeed, the hippocampus has been noted to be especially important for memory of rich 
configural associations, such as those required in spatial navigation (Maguire et al., 1997).  The 
lack of detail of the word pairs may cause them to activate the MTL at a relatively low level, but 
this low level of activation could still be critical to memory formation and cause amnesics with 
MTL damage to have great difficulty in making arbitrary word pair associations. 
 Law, et al (2005) performed a study which also involved an arbitrary multiple choice task 
with feedback.  Participants learned to associate kaleidoscope images with one of four spatial 
locations.  The effect of positive versus negative feedback on brain activation was not examined, 
but instead the authors focus on the effects of memory strength on brain activation.  Participants 
were trained on sets of trials with 4-12 new associations to be learned, and each set was repeated 
until it was well learned before moving on to a new set.  MTL activation was found to increase 
with memory strength, while activation in other regions, including the DLPFC and right caudate 
nucleus, were found to decrease once an association was well-learned.  Early indications of the 
latter effect were observed in Experiment 1 of the present work, but the MTL did not show 
increases in activity over the three rounds of trials, indicating that more repetitions may be 
necessary for such an effect to come about. 
4.3.2 Striatal Contributions  
Brain regions involved in the formation of declarative memories, including the 
hippocampus/parahippocampus, left fusiform gyrus, left inferior frontal gyrus were recruited in 
these experiments.  This was true irrespective of activation of the striatum; similar regions 
showed a subsequent memory effect for both Round 1 of Experiment 1, in which no caudate 
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activation was present and for Experiment 2, in which the caudate was recruited.  Therefore, it 
appears that the engagement of declarative memory does not preclude the recruitment of the 
striatal reward system, nor does engagement of the striatum prevent the engagement of the 
declarative memory system. 
A more difficult question is whether the engagement of the striatum contributes to 
learning in a declarative memory task.  Previous studies have suggested that the striatum does 
contribute to learning in situations which do not robustly engage the declarative memory system 
(Knowlton et al., 1996; Poldrack et al., 2001; Poldrack et al., 1999; Tricomi et al., 2006).  
Therefore, the striatal system does not seem to be simply registering the presence of response-
contingent rewards or punishments, but seems to be using that reward-related information to 
form associations.   
One test of this would be to determine whether it would be possible to eventually master 
the task utilized in the experiments presented here without relying on the declarative memory 
system.  In all probability, the sheer number of trials would be prohibitive.  One 
neuropsychology study did find that two patients with MTL lesions were able to slowly master 
an 8-pair object discrimination task, in which they learned on the basis of feedback which object 
from each pair was the correct choice.  However, it took over a thousand trials over many weeks 
of training for task mastery to occur (Bayley et al., 2005).  Scaling up this type of task to 
mastering 60-180 distinct trials, rather than 8, would be impractical, if not impossible.  
Nevertheless, the study indicates that a task that normally relies on declarative memory can still 
be learned without a properly functioning declarative memory system, so presumably a scaled-
down version of the feedback-based paired associate word-learning task used in the experiments 
presented here would also be able to be acquired in a similar manner.  
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In the absence of a declarative memory system, the striatum is capable of the slow 
formation of stimulus-response-outcome contingencies.  Does this preclude the striatum from 
acting to strengthen memory representations over much shorter time periods when the 
declarative memory system is intact?  The fact that the caudate showed a subsequent memory 
effect in Experiment 2 for the immediate post-test (i.e., after only a single presentation of each 
trial) suggests otherwise.  There are several possible mechanisms by which caudate activity 
could facilitate this type of learning, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  One 
possibility is that activation in the caudate on correct trials, by strengthening S-R-O associations, 
could automatize the retrieval of correct responses.  Even though the experiments presented here 
involved few repetitions of the same trials, there is some evidence that such an effect was already 
occurring.  In Experiment 1, reaction time differences emerged between correct and incorrect 
responses on Round 3, which is the first round where effects of caudate activation should be 
observed, since no caudate activation was present during Round 1.  Likewise, increased signal in 
the caudate on correct trials during Round 2 was associated with decreased reaction times for the 
corresponding trials on Round 3.  Consistent with these findings, positive feedback in 
Experiment 2 led to decreased reaction times and increased confidence on the post-test, relative 
to negative feedback. 
A second way that the striatum could influence memory acquisition is by interacting with 
the hippocampus in a way that facilitates memory for reward-relevant associations.  This idea is 
supported by neural circuitry.  Dopaminergic neurons in both the VTA and the substantia nigra 
project to both the hippocampus and the striatum (Lisman & Grace, 2005).  Thus, information 
coded in the activity of dopaminergic neurons regarding reward-related information should be 
received by the declarative memory system as well as the striatum, and it is possible that such 
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dopaminergic input could facilitate memory.  Indeed, long-term potentiation in the hippocampus 
in enhanced by activation of dopamine receptors, and administration of dopamine has been 
shown to improve memory performance in both rats and humans (Lisman & Grace, 2005).  
Therefore, the increased activation following correct feedback that was observed in the caudate 
for trials that would subsequently be remembered could be a reflection of increased firing of 
dopaminergic neurons on those trials, which would also have led to increased release of 
dopamine in the hippocampus, presumably enhancing declarative memory.  Alternatively, it is 
possible that caudate activity actually affects the firing of dopaminergic neurons, since it projects 
back to the substantia nigra (Haber et al., 2000).  For example, one possibility is that the caudate 
could integrate information about the presence of rewarding stimuli with contextual cues to 
either amplify or attenuate the activity in dopaminergic neurons, which then could modulate LTP 
in the hippocampus. 
Interestingly, no subsequent memory effect was found in the caudate for negative 
feedback, which may indicate that the caudate is more effective at strengthening associations 
than forming negative associations.  This fits with the finding that overcoming interference from 
negative responses seems to be dependent on an intact MTL, whereas memory is much less 
impaired if amnesics never generate an incorrect response.  There may be a natural tendency for 
the cortex to reinforce incorrect associations via Hebbian learning when an incorrect response is 
made, which the MTL can counteract (McClelland et al., 1999).  It is possible that over many 
repetitions with negative feedback, the striatum could overcome this tendency as well, but that 
the MTL can do so much more efficiently.  
Performance-related feedback is a very common instructional tool, used in declarative 
and nondeclarative learning tasks alike (Goodman, 1998; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Schmidt & 
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Bjork, 1992).  Because of the engagement of the reward system, feedback-based learning seems 
to be in some way fundamentally different from rote memorization, even if the content of what is 
learned is similar.  What is it about the engagement of the reward system that might cause 
feedback to be so commonly used?  One possibility is that compared to passively memorizing, 
feedback-based learning may increase motivation by causing learners to feel a stronger sense of 
agency in the learning process.  There is an affective component to the “reward” or 
“punishment” of positive and negative feedback, which may make feedback-based learning seem 
almost like playing a game.  If learners are invested in the outcome of their responses, they may 
attend more to the task than if the task involved no feedback.  If this is the case, there might be 
practical implications of research on the neural basis of feedback-based learning.  Feedback 
might be expected to have higher impact on motivation in situations where it elicits a response in 
the striatum, such as when the task includes instances with more than two response options.  
However, such conjectures are speculative and would require further investigation.      
4.4 TRIAL SUMMARY 
The presentation of the word display marks the beginning of each trial.  This display acts 
as a cue that a response is required, and also acts as a temporal predictor that feedback will be 
presented shortly.  At this point, if there is uncertainty about the value that feedback will provide 
to the learner, the caudate signal begins to rise.  The learner chooses a response and waits for the 
feedback.  During this interval, the rise in caudate activation may act to ready the attentional 
system to focus on the rewarding or punishing aspects of the upcoming outcome.  If the outcome 
is better than expected, feedback provides information and the caudate signal remains relatively 
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elevated.  This “reward” response appears to strengthen the particular stimulus-response-
outcome associations involved on that trial; the greater the caudate signal is, the more solidified 
that knowledge of the correct word pair becomes, as evidenced by decreased reaction time or 
increased chance of an accurate response on the next trial involving the same stimuli.  Eventually 
knowledge of the right answer becomes automatic.  There becomes less uncertainty about the 
value of feedback, since positive feedback becomes expected.  Therefore, the caudate tends to 
activate less strongly.  The outcome matches expectation, providing no new information, and the 
caudate’s response likewise remains relatively flat.  If the outcome is worse than expected, 
feedback provides information by indicating an error, and the response decreases rapidly from its 
peak.  This “punishment” signal may act to help prevent the strengthening of the incorrect S-R-O 
association; however there is little evidence to suggest that this signal facilitates performance on 
the next trial involving the same stimuli.  Finally, the intertrial interval allows the caudate signal 
to return to baseline.  During this time, however, other brain regions, such as the MTL, may still 
be engaged as learners invoke associative strategies to aid them in remembering the correct 
answer.  
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The work presented here has demonstrated that the caudate nuclei are involved in 
feedback processing when positive and negative feedback have differential value to the 
individual.  Specifically, the value of feedback appears to be related to the degree to which it 
provides goal-related information, whether this be task-related information that can aid 
performance or performance-related information that indicates whether one’s goal is being met.  
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This is not to say that recruitment of the caudate is necessary for feedback-based learning to 
occur.  In the experimental paradigm used in this dissertation, by holding in mind the memory of 
the response and then incorporating the information provided by the feedback about whether that 
response was correct, learning could take place in much the same way as it would in a typical 
paired associate memory task.  Nevertheless, due to the ways in which feedback provides 
information about the consequences of our responses, the caudate processes the reward value of 
feedback and may serve to reinforce memories or to prevent such reinforcement.  Through its 
examination of the factors that influence the engagement of the reward system during feedback-
based learning, this dissertation furthers our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying 
learning and memory.      
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Table 1:  Experiment 1 Accuracy and Reaction Time Across Experimental Rounds 
 
Accuracy 
(Mean ± SD) 
t-value 
(compared to chance 
performance, *indicates 
p< 0.05, two-tailed) 
Reaction time  
(ms; Mean ± SD) 
Round 1 50% ± 0 N/A 2012 ± 330 
Round 2 61.97% ± 7.74 t(10) = 5.13* 2133 ± 220 
Round 3 75.15% ± 7.13 t(10) = 11.70* 2039 ± 214 
immediate post-test 83.03% ± 8.06 t(10) = 13.60* 2854 ± 595 
1 week post-test 71.67% ± 11.60 t(9) = 5.91* 3639 ± 752 




Table 2:  Experiment 1 Reaction Time for Correct Versus Incorrect Trials 
 
Correct Trials 
(ms; Mean ± SD) 
Incorrect Trials 
(ms; Mean ± SD) 
t-value 
(correct vs. incorrect 
trials, *indicates 
p< 0.05, two-tailed) 
Round 1 1997 ± 365 2027 ± 306 t(10) = -0.74 
Round 2 2152 ± 259 2128 ± 255 t(10) = 0.30 
Round 3 1986 ± 229 2203 ± 189 t(10) = -5.06* 
immediate post-test 2803 ± 595 3234 ± 602 t(10) = -3.32* 
1 week post-test 3501 ± 688 4024 ± 963 t(9) = -3.21* 
Note:  The 1 week post-test results do not include data from one participant, who failed to  
return for the post-test. 
 
 
Table 3:  Experiment 1 Confidence for Correct Versus Incorrect Trials 
 
Correct Trials 
(Mean ± SD) 
Incorrect Trials 
(Mean ± SD) 
t-value 
(correct vs. incorrect 
trials, *indicates 
p< 0.05, two-tailed) 
immediate post-test 6.2 ± 0.2 4.5 ± 0.7 t(10) = 7.6* 
1 week post-test 5.2 ± 0.5 4.4 ± 0.6 t(9) = 4.8* 
Note:  The 1 week post-test results do not include data from one participant, who failed to  
return for the post-test. 
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Table 4:   Experiment 1 Round X Time (p<0.0001) 





(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
Round 1 > Rounds 2 & 3     
 Medial frontal gyrus (L) 6 61 -11, 1, 58 6.2 
 
Superior frontal gyrus (L) 
(decreasing activation) 8, 9 44 -21, 48, 32 5.3 
 Middle frontal gyrus (R) 8, 9 15 32, 24, 35 4.7 
 Inferior frontal gyrus (L) 44, 45 48 -47, 24, 9 5.2 
 
Inferior parietal lobule (R) 
(decreasing activation) 40 13 57, -39, 26 3.8 
 Superior temporal gyrus (L) 22 5 -56, -30, 6 3.7 
 Middle temporal gyrus (L) 37 9 -50, -56, 6 3.8 
 Fusiform gyrus (L) 37 8 -40, -40, -9 3.7 
Rounds 2 & 3 > Round 1     
 Medial frontal gyrus (L) 6 32 -1, 18, 44 4.8 
 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (L) 8, 9 66 -44 18, 32 5.8 
 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (R) 9 26 48, 21, 29 5.9 
 Middle frontal gyrus (L) 10 13 -38, 46, 15 4.2 
 Lateral orbitofrontal cortex (L) 11 10 -21, 42, -9 4.3 
 
Inferior parietal lobule, angular  
gyrus (L) 7, 39 157 -40, -58, 38 7.2 
 
Cuneus, precuneus, posterior 
cingulate cortex (L) 18, 19, 31 279 -11, -71, 23 9.9 
 
Precuneus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 31 4 11, -65, 26 3.5 
 Lingual gyrus (R) 18 7 2, -80, -9 3.6 
 Middle occipital gyrus (L) 18 10 -27, -83, -9 3.6 
 Insula (R) 13 24 26, 24, 3 5.5 
 Putamen (R)  58 26, -5, 15 5.6 
 Caudate nuclei (bilateral)  32 8, 8, 6 3.8 
 Superior medial cerebellum (L)  9 -11, -78, -21 3.6 
 
Table 5:  Experiment 1 Accuracy X Time (p<0.0001) 





(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
correct > incorrect 
 
Postcentral gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 3 11 30,-36, 44 5.41 
 Anterior cingulate (R) 32 6 18, 27, 9 5.48 
 Inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 7 -28, -40, 47 5.35 
 Inferior parietal lobule (R) (decreasing activation) 40 5 29 -49, 47 4.94 
 
Cingulate (R)  
(decreasing activation) 31 5 11, -27, 44 6.07 
 Posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex (R) 29 5 8, -36, 9 5.16 
 Parahippocampal gyrus, posterior cingulate (L) 19 91 -21, -52, 12 7.19 
 
Superior temporal gyrus (R) (decreasing 
activation) 22 39 51, -5, -3 6.56 
 
Cuneus, middle occipital gyrus, lingual gyrus, 
parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform gyrus (R) 19 356 23, -59, -6 10.94 
 
Cuneus, middle occipital gyrus, inferior occipital 
gyrus (L) 19 77 -31, -75, -6 7.06 
 
Cuneus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 18 4 -18, -87, 23 4.99 
 Cuneus (R) 18 6 8, -77, 15 5.17 
incorrect > correct 
Medial frontal gyrus/skull  9 4, -14, 73 6.02 
Medial frontal gyrus, superior  frontal gyrus, dorsal 
anterior cingulate (midline) 6, 8, 32 275 -2, 0, 53 9.67 
Superior frontal gyrus (L) 9 19 -24, 39, 29 6.21 
Middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus (L) 9, 45, 46 109 9, 45, 46 7.83 
Inferior frontal gyrus (L) 26 6 -24, 27,-9 6.11 
Precentral gyrus (R) 
(decreasing activation) 4 5 54, -8, 38 5.41 
Postcentral gyrus (L) 1, 2, 3 70 -43, -22, 53 7.52 
Superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule, 
angular gyrus (L) 7, 39, 40 130 -37, -56, 38 9.59 
Inferior parietal lobule (R) 40 16 45, -58, 47 7.78 
Insula, inferior parietal lobule (R)  
(decreasing activation) 13 10 42, -27, 23 5.89 
Insula (L) 13 10 -31, 21, 9 5.41 
Middle temporal gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus, 
fusiform gyrus, anterior cerebellum (L) 21, 37 168 -40, -53, -24 9.3 
Middle temporal gyrus (R) 21 5 60, -33, -9 4.93 
 Medial inferior cerebellum (bilateral)  104 14, -75, -24 8.99 
multiple patterns 
 
Posterior cingulate, caudate nuclei, thalamus, 
putamen  998 -8, 8, 0 15.45 
correct > 
incorrect      caudate nuclei (bilateral)   -8, 8, 0 15.5 
incorrect >       posterior cingulate 23  2, -36, 20 7.1 
correct      putamen (R)   23, -5, 0 8.2 
      putamen (L)   -27, -5, 0 11.0 
      thalamus, caudate body (L)   -14, -13, 18 12.5 
      thalamus, caudate body (R)   14, -11, 15 10.8 
Note:  When clusters contained more than 100 voxels and had multiple peaks, the threshold was raised until they 
split into clusters of fewer than 100 voxels, and the activation patterns in these smaller clusters were examined.  In 
one case, the smaller regions showed different patterns of activation, and so the region is listed under “multiple 
patterns,” with the patterns of the smaller regions listed beneath. 
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Table 6:  Experiment 1 Round X Accuracy X Time (p<0.0001) 





(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
correct > incorrect difference greatest on Round 3 
medial frontal gyrus (R) 6 24 11, -5, 53 4.3 
Precentral gyrus (R) 6 5 38, -5, 38 3.77 
Superior parietal lobule (R) 
(decreasing activation) 7 6 24, -49, 58 3.49 
Precuneus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 7 5 17, -45, 41 3.37 
 
Posterior cingulate (R)  
(decreasing activation) 29 9 20, -47, 9 3.96 
incorrect > correct difference greatest on Round 3 
superior frontal gyrus (L) 8 42 -5, 36, 50 4.42 
superior frontal gyrus (L) 8 7 -8, 52, 44 3.72 
Middle frontal gyrus (R) 6 6 32, 9, 56 3.4 
Middle frontal gyrus (L) 6 10 -39, 5, 47 3.51 
Middle frontal gyrus (L) 10 10 -37, 58, 12 4.43 
medial frontal gyrus (midline) 
(decreasing activation) 9 17 2, 42, 20 4.13 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
inferior frontal gyrus/ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex, insula (L) 
9, 13, 46, 
47 201 -37, 17, 6 5.03 
anterior cingulate (midline) 32 25 -2, 24, 38 4.33 
posterior cingulate (midline) 31 44 -2, -39, 29 5.66 
cingulate gyrus (L)  7 -18, 9, 23 3.58 
Posterior cingulate (L)  
(decreasing activation) 31 5 -20, -61, 15 3.45 
precuneus (R) 7 22 -5, -55, 67 4.12 
superior parietal lobule, inferior 
parietal lobule, angular gyrus, 
middle temporal gyrus (L) 7, 39, 40 178 -47, -61, 44 4.65 
middle temporal gyrus, inferiror 
temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus (L) 20, 21, 37 53 -56, -24, -6 4.21 
caudate body (R)  35 17, -8, 23 4.55 
caudate body (L)  11 -18, -16, 23 3.78 
Medial inferior cerebellum (L)  38 -14, -87, -24 4.62 
Lateral superior cerebellum (R)  9 42, -72, -24 4.27 
 Medial inferior cerebellum (R)  7 14, -74, -24 3.48 
 
Table 7:  Experiment 2 Trial Type X Time (p<0.001) 





(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
2 choices > 4 choices 
superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, 
inferior frontal gyrus (R), medial frontal 
gyrus, anterior cingulate (bilateral) 
6, 8, 9, 
10, 32, 
44 1228 6, 29, 48 9.67 
medial frontal gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 6 6 -18, 10, 51 3.88 
middle frontal gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 8 11 -31, 13, 42 3.87 
precentral gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation)  11 -31, -, 27 3.75 
paracentral lobule (midline) 
(decreasing activation) 5 37 3, -27, 54 4.92 
posterior cingulate (midline) 23, 31 60 3, -38, 33 4.95 
inferior parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus, 
angular gyrus, middle temporal gyrus (R) 39, 40 645 51, -48, 39 11.58 
precuneus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 7 10 6, -59, 33 3.85 
insula (L) 13 5 -45, -2, 18 3.86 
insula (R)  5 24, 21, -6 3.9 
superior temporal gyrus,  
middle temporal gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 21, 22 310 48, -24, -6 7.83 
middle temporal gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 21 82 -48, -21, -6 7.18 
middle temporal gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 21 5 -48, -5, -15 3.79 
inferior temporal gyrus (R) 
 (decreasing activation) 20 4 44, -8, -18 3.91 
 caudate body/ventricle  33 6, 7, 21 5.88 
4 choices > 2 choices 
medial frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate 
(midline) 6, 24 184 -4, 1, 45 7.95 
middle frontal gyrus (R) 6 9 24, -9, 45 4.06 
precentral gyrus (R) 6 25 34, -15, 57 6.41 
precentral gyrus (L) 6 11 -58, 3, 30 4.42 
precuneus, cuneus, middle occipital gyrus, 
lingual gyrus, inferior occipital gyrus, 
fusiform gyrus, sup. cerebellum (bilateral) 
7, 17, 
18, 19 3212 3, -77, -3 33.97 
 thalamus (L)  20 -14, -21, 6 4.55 
multiple patterns  
 
precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus, inferior 
parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus, 
angular gyrus, middle temporal gyrus (L) 
2, 3, 4, 
6, 39, 
40 679 -38, -31, 48 9.87 
2 choices > 
4 choices 
     inferior parietal       
     lobe, supramarginal gyrus 40  -58, -48, 36 7.18 
     precentral gyrus (L) 4  -31, -21, 60 7.24 4 choices > 
2 choices      postcentral gyrus (L) 2, 3  -38, -31, 48 9.87 
Note:  When clusters contained more than 100 voxels and had multiple peaks, the threshold was raised 
until they split into clusters of fewer than 100 voxels, and the activation patterns in these smaller clusters 
were examined.  In one case, the smaller regions showed different patterns of activation, and so the 
region is listed under “multiple patterns,” with the patterns of the smaller regions listed beneath. 
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Table 8:  Experiment 2 Feedback Type X Time (p<0.001) 






(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
positive feedback > negative feedback 
precentral gyrus, middle frontal 
gyrus (L) 6, 8, 9 38 -44, -3, 45 4.31 
middle frontal gyrus/inferior 
frontal gyrus (L) 45, 46 41 -48, 20, 24 5.18 
inferior frontal gyrus (L) 46 5 -44, 36, 6 3.7 
anterior cingulate (R) 
(decreasing activation) 24 5 14, 23, -3 3.86 
insula (L) 13 8 -34, 20, 6 4 
insula (R) 13 9 27, 25, 0 4 
inferior temporal gyrus, middle 
occipital gyrus (L) 19, 37 35 -48, -67, 0 5.45 
middle temporal gyrus (L) 21 13 -58, -34, -3 4.11 
middle occipital gyrus (R) 19 58 34, -69, -6 5.56 
 thalamus (bilateral); midbrain (L)  45 -8, -14, 3 6.11 
negative feedback > positive feedback 
superior frontal gyrus/middle 
frontal gyrus 8, 9, 46 65 30, 38, 33 5.36 
superior frontal gyrus (L) 
(decreasing activation) 10 4 -10, 71, 21 3.75 
middle frontal gyrus (R) 
(decreasing activation) 6 18 24, 1, 51 4.65 
middle frontal gyrus (L) 
(decreasing activation) 8, 9 5 -27, 23, 39 3.46 
middle frontal gyrus (L) 
(decreasing activation) 9 4 -27, 36, 27 3.62 
precentral gyrus (L) 4 36 -31, -15, 45 6.58 
cingulate gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 31 23 10, -38, 39 6.53 
cingulate gyrus (L) 24 8 -4, 1, 39 3.88 
inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 5 -58, -27, 30 3.63 
precuneus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 31 10 10, -68, 24 4.2 
lingual gyrus (R) 18 5 9, -83, 0 3.87 
inferior occipital gyrus (L) 18 9 -38, -83, -3 3.77 
inferior occipital gyrus (R) 17 8 24, -101, -9 4.31 




Table 9:  Experiment 2 Trial Type X Feedback Type X Time (p<0.001) 






(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
positive feedback > negative feedback for 4-choice condition only 
superior frontal gyrus (L) 6 11 -28, -3, 63 4.46 
superior frontal gyrus, medial 
frontal gyrus (bilateral) 6, 8 156 -4, 26, 48 6.76 
superior frontal gyrus (L) 10 7 -21, 55, 21 3.66 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
inferior frontal gyrus/ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex, insula (L) 
9, 13, 
44, 45, 
46, 47 542 -51, 17, 3 10.22 
inferior frontal gyrus (ventrolateral 
PFC) (R) 45, 47 49 48, 20, 9 6.05 
inferior frontal gyrus (R) 47 15 37, 32, -12 4.14 
anterior cingulate (midline) 
(decreasing activation) 32 17 3, 43, 0 4.6 
inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 73 -45, -59, 42 5.83 
insula (R) 13 10 27, 20, 3 4.17 
middle temporal gyrus (L) 21 38 -62, -45, 0 5.04 
 
dorsal head of the caudate 
nucleus (R)  10 10, 7, 15 4.19 
negative feedback > positive feedback for 4-choice condition only 
anterior cingulate (R)  
(decreasing activation) 32 26 10, 42, 15 4.59 
insula (L)  
(decreasing activation) 13 4 -35, -18, 24 3.8 
precuneus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 31 13 3, -66, 21 3.99 
precuneus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 31 9 -21, -59, 18 4.1 
parahippocampal gyrus/ventricle 
(decreasing activation) 19 4 -31, -52, 0 4.31 
 fusiform gyrus (R) 19 28 24, -80, -12 3.71 
positive feedback > negative feedback for 2-choice condition only 
 
parahippocampal gyrus (R) 
(decreasing activation) 36 22 27, -21, -25 4.87 
negative feedback > positive feedback for 2-choice condition only 
superior frontal gyrus, middle 
frontal gyrus (decreasing 
activation) 6, 8 14 30, 26, 54 3.96 
middle frontal gyrus (R) 
(decreasing activation) 6 15 24, 7, 45 4.46 
superior temporal gyrus (R) 
(decreasing activation) 38 4 52, 17,-25 3.75 




Table 10:  Experiment 2 4-choice Condition:  Feedback Type X Time (p<0.001) 






(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
positive feedback > negative feedback  
superior frontal gyrus (midline) 8 73 -4, 29, 48 5.58 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 




46, 47 838 -51, 19, 27 11.38 
middle frontal gyrus (R) 10 7 36, 46, 0 3.64 
inferior frontal gyrus/VLPFC, 
insula (R) 
13, 45, 
47 168 48, 20, 15 8.18 
anterior cingulate (bilateral) 
(decreasing activation) 32 109 -4, 36, 18 4.93 
anterior cingulate (L)  4 -20, 26, 15 3.65 
inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 71 -48, -56, 42 6.11 
middle temporal gyrus (L) 21, 22 147 -58, -38, -3 8.09 
caudate nucleus (L)  50 -11, 10, 6 4.93 
caudate nucleus (R)  22 6, 10, 3 4.56 
thalamus/midbrain (bilateral)  26 -4, -15, 3 4.69 
cuneus/lingual gyrus (R) 18 15 26, -96, 0 4.33 
 Inferior cerebellum (R)  63 20, -73, -25 5.67 
negative feedback > positive feedback 
medial frontal gyrus (R) 
(decreasing activation) 6 9 20, 1, 51 3.76 
precentral gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 6 7 -37, -15, 36 4.29 
cingulate gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 31 8 7, -38, 39 4.62 
inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 11 -48, -32, 27 4.34 
insula (L)  
(decreasing activation) 13 4 -38, -15, 21 3.9 
precuneus (bilateral)  
(decreasing activation) 31 135 10, -66, 21 6.75 
parahippocampal gyrus (R) 
(decreasing activation) 30 14 17, -38, -3 5.71 
parahippocampal gyrus (L) 
(decreasing activation) 19 8 -31, -42, -3 4.38 




Table 11:  Experiment 2 2-choice Condition:  Feedback Type X Time (p<0.001) 






(x, y, z) 
Maximum 
F Value 
positive feedback > negative feedback 
superior frontal gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 8 8 24, 35, 51 3.93 
anterior cingulate (R)  4 14, 26, -9 3.78 
middle occipital gyrus (R) 19 23 37, -65, -6 4.49 
 
parahippocampal gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 36 5 28, -15, -22 3.62 
negative feedback > positive feedback 
superior frontal gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 8 10 21, 16, 45 4.43 
middle frontal gyrus (L) 10 5 -38, 36, 24 4.04 
precentral gyrus (L) 6 7 -31, -11, 51 3.86 
anterior cingulate (L) 32 29 -4, 10, 42 4.9 
 
cingulate gyrus (R)  




Table 12:  Experiment 2 Subsequent Memory Effects:  
Post-test accuracy (high confidence correct trials vs. incorrect trials) X Time (p<0.001) 





(x, y, z) 
Maximum
F Value 
subsequent high confidence correct responses > incorrect responses 
postcentral gyrus (L) 3 6 -48, -18, 57 3.61 
middle frontal gyrus (R) 9 32 41, 4, 36 5.15 
inferior frontal gyrus (L) 10, 47 137 -51, 22, 3 6.68 
anterior inferior frontal gyrus (R) 47 5 50, 43, 0 4.07 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (L) 10 59 -8, 55, -3 5.4 
posterior middle temporal gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 39 5 -47, -69, 21 3.83 
middle temporal gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 21 7 -61, -47, 9 3.79 
middle temporal gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 21 48 -65,-25, -3 4.61 
middle temporal gyrus (R)  
(decreasing activation) 21 6 54, -39, -3 4 
lingual gyrus (L)  
(decreasing activation) 18 13 -8, -59, 3 4.08 
lingual gyrus (R) 18 5 13,-73, 0 3.68 
lingual gyrus (L) 18 11 -14, -97, -3 4.15 
inferior occipital gyrus (R) 18 13 41, -80, -6 3.88 
middle occipital gyrus, fusiform 
gyrus (L) 18 45 -45, -77, -9 4.29 
anterior caudate/ventricle (L)  
(decreasing activation) 
 
 8 -13, 26, 9 4.14 
thalamus (L)  4 -4, -8, 12 3.64 
 Hippocampus/parahippocampus (L)  11 -31, -15, -6 4.56 
subsequent incorrect responses > high confidence correct responses 
posterior inferior frontal gyrus (R) 44 4 48, 4, 18 4.67 
 
precuneus (R)  






Figure 1.  Experimental Design.   
 
Each trial, a target word was presented, along with options for possible word matches, labeled as in a multiple-
choice test.  After a 4 s response period, the display was replaced with a 1 s feedback display of 3 green √s, 
indicating a correct response, 3 red Xs, indicating an incorrect response, or 3 white hypens, indicating that no 
response was made.  After a 13 s delay, with a screen showing a fixation cross, the next trial began. 
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Figure 2.  Brain Regions Showing a Round by Time Interaction in Experiment 1. 
 
Voxel clusters displaying a Round by Time interaction in Experiment 1 are shown (p < 0.0001; contiguity threshold 
of 4 voxels).  The green crosshair marks the caudate voxel with the peak F-value.  Images are left-right reversed. 
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Figure 3.  Time Course of Activation in the Caudate Region Displaying a Round by Time Effect. 
 
The caudate nuclei displayed a relatively flat pattern of activation during Round 1 trials, while there is greater 
activation during Rounds 2 and 3.  The activation is somewhat attenuated on Round 3 relative to Round 2.  Each 




Figure 4.  Brain Regions Showing an Accuracy by Time Effect in Experiment 1. 
 
Voxel clusters displaying an Accuracy by Time interaction in Experiment 1 are shown (p < 0.0001; contiguity 






























Figure 5.  Time Courses of Activation 
in the Caudate Region Displaying an 
Accuracy by Time Effect. 
 
There is a slight differentiation between 
trials with positive and negative 
feedback during Round 1, whereas for  
Rounds 2 and 3, the signal following 
negative feedback shows a pronounced 
dip below baseline, unlike the signal 
following positive feedback.  Each time 
period (T1, T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s 
image acquisition.  The dotted line 




Figure 6.  Brain Regions Showing a Round by Accuracy by Time Interaction in Experiment 1. 
Voxel clusters displaying a Round by Accuracy by Time interaction in Experiment 1 are shown (p < 0.0001; 
contiguity threshold of 4 voxels).  Images are left-right reversed. 
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Figure 7. Time Courses of Activation in the Caudate Body Region Showing a Round by Accuracy by Time 
Interaction. 
 
Activation is elicited on all three rounds in the caudate body, with an earlier response on correct trials than on 
incorrect trials during Round 3, but not Rounds 1 and 2.  Each time period (T1, T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s image 
acquisition.  The dotted line indicates the onset of the feedback display. 
91 























Figure 8.  Time Courses of 
Activation in the Left 
Prefrontal Cortex/Insula 
Region Showing a Round by 
Accuracy by Time Interaction. 
 
The signal is greater following 
incorrect than correct trials, and 
this difference is greatest on 
Round 3.  Each time period (T1, 
T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s image 
acquisition.  The dotted line 




Figure 9. Hippocampal Regions Showing a Main Effect of Time and their Time Courses of Activation. 
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Hippocampal activation clusters displaying a main effect of time are shown, along with the time courses of 
activation in these regions.  The signal decreases from trial onset, and recovers following the feedback display.  This 
recovery is increasingly slower following negative feedback as round increases.  Each time period (T1, T2, etc.) 
respresents a 2 s image acquisition.  The dotted line indicates the onset of the feedback display.  The brain image is 
left-right reversed. 
 
Figure 10.  Experiment 2 Behavioral Results from the Immediate Post-test 
a) Mean reaction times (normalized to the subject mean) are graphed as a function of post-test accuracy, as well as 
the trial type and feedback type of the corresponding trial from the scanning session.  Participants responded more 
quickly on accurate trials for which they had received positive feedback during the scan.  b) Mean confidence scores 
(normalized to the subject mean) were higher for accurate trials than inaccurate trials and higher for trials for which 
participants received positive feedback rather than negative feedback during the scan.  For accurate trials, the latter 
effect was more pronounced for the 4-choice condition than the 2-choice condition. 
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Figure 11.  Experiment 2 Behavioral Results from the One-week Follow-up Post-test. 
a) Mean reaction times (normalized to the subject mean) are graphed as a function of post-test accuracy, as well as 
the trial type and feedback type of the corresponding trial from the scanning session.  For the 4-choice condition, 
reaction time did not differ based on feedback type, but was faster for correct than incorrect trials.  For the 2-choice 
condition, reaction time was fastest for incorrect trials for which they received positive feedback during the scan, 
slowest for incorrect trials for which they received negative feedback, and in between for correct trials.  b) Although 
mean confidence scores (normalized to the subject mean) were generally lower for the follow-up post-test than the 
immediate post-test, the pattern of results is the same.  That is, confidence was higher for accurate trials than 
inaccurate trials and higher for trials for which participants received positive feedback rather than negative feedback 




Figure 12.  Brain Regions Showing a Trial Type by Time Interaction in Experiment 2. 
 
Voxel clusters displaying a Trial Type by Time interaction in Experiment 2 are shown (p < 0.001; contiguity 
threshold of 4 voxels).  Images are left-right reversed. 
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Figure 13.  Brain Regions Showing a Feedback Type by Time Interaction in Experiment 2   
 
Voxel clusters displaying a Feedback Type by Time interaction in Experiment 2 are shown (p < 0.001; contiguity 




Figure 14.  Brain Regions Showing a Trial Type by Feedback Type by Time Interaction in Experiment 2. 
Voxel clusters displaying a Trial Type by Feedback Type by Time interaction in Experiment 2 are shown (p < 
0.001; contiguity threshold of 4 voxels).  The green crosshair marks the caudate voxel with the peak F-value.  
Images are left-right reversed. 
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Figure 15.  Time Courses of Activation in the Right Caudate Region Showing a Trial Type by Feedback Type 
by Time Interaction. 
 
The signal is greater following positive feedback than negative feedback in the 4-choice condition but not the 2-
choice condition.  Each time period (T1, T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s image acquisition.  The dotted line indicates the 
onset of the feedback display. 
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Figure 16.  Time Courses of Activation in the Left Prefrontal Cortex/Insula Region Showing a Trial Type by 
Feedback Type by Time Interaction. 
 
The signal is greatest following positive feedback in the 4-choice condition and least strong following negative 
feedback in the 4-choice condition, with the signal following both positive and negative feedback displaying an 
intermediate level of activation.  Each time period (T1, T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s image acquisition.  The dotted line 
indicates the onset of the feedback display. 
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Figure 17.  Brain Regions Showing a Feedback Type by Time Interaction in the 4-choice Condition of 
Experiment 2. 
 
Voxel clusters displaying a Feedback Type by Time interaction in the 4-choice condition of Experiment 2 are shown 
(p < 0.001; contiguity threshold of 4 voxels).  The green crosshair marks the caudate voxel with the peak F-value.  




Figure 18.  Brain Regions Showing a Feedback Type by Time Interaction in the 2-choice Condition of 
Experiment 2. 
 
Voxel clusters displaying a Feedback Type by Time interaction in the 2-choice condition of Experiment 2 are shown 
(p < 0.001; contiguity threshold of 4 voxels).  Images are left-right reversed. 
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Figure 19.  Time Courses of Activation in the Caudate Regions Showing a Feedback Type by Time 
Interaction for the 4-choice Condition. 
 
The signal is greater following positive feedback than negative feedback in the 4-choice condition but not the 2-
choice condition.  Each time period (T1, T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s image acquisition.  The dotted line indicates the 
onset of the feedback display. 
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Figure 20.  Medial Temporal Lobe Regions Showing a Main Effect of Time and their Time Courses of 
Activation.  
 
Activation clusters in the hippocampus/parahippocampus displaying a main effect of time are shown, along with the 
time courses of activation in these regions.  As in Experiment 1, the signal decreases from trial onset, and recovers 
following the feedback display.  Each time period (T1, T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s image acquisition.  The dotted line 
indicates the onset of the feedback display.  The brain image is left-right reversed. 
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Figure 21.  Brain Regions Showing a Subsequent Memory Effect in Experiment 2. 
Voxel clusters displaying differential activation on trials remembered with high confidence versus incorrect trials in 
Experiment 2 are shown (p < 0.001; contiguity threshold of 4 voxels).  Images are left-right reversed. 
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Figure 22.  Time Courses of Activation in the Caudate as a Function of Post-test Accuracy. 
The signal in the caudate regions identified as showing a Feedback by Time Effect in Experiment 2 is plotted 
separately for trials associated with correct and incorrect performance on the immediate post-test.  In the left 
caudate, the signal following positive feedback is greater for trials that will later be remembered than trials that will 
be forgotten.  This effect is not significant in the right caudate nucleus.  No differences are observed in the signal 
following negative feedback.  Each time period (T1, T2, etc.) respresents a 2 s image acquisition.  The dotted line 
indicates the onset of the feedback display.  The brain image is left-right reversed. 
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